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Abstract 
This is a study of the British military actions in Western Germany during the Seven Years War, 
investigating the army’s ability in combat and analysing its improvements through the case 
study of the Battle of Vellinghausen. This will provide a more concentrated scope of the conflict 
centred on the Western theatre, rather than the general study upon the British army in America 
or the academic’s attraction with the Battle of Minden. With this in mind the research will be 
significant as it will open up discussions on how the British army fought in the European style 
during the mid-eighteenth century, as well as aiming to explore whether the British army learnt 
from its lessons early in the war to become an efficient fighting machine. 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the actions of the British army during the Seven Years 
War in Western Germany, breaking the army down into its component parts to highlight how 
the army fought on a European battlefield. By addressing the campaigns during 1758-61, this 
gives me several key battles with which to analyse whether the army improved its performance. 
The mid-eighteenth century was a period of shifting tactics in the way European war was 
fought, with new tactics and doctrine altering warfare, such as the adoption of irregular forces, 
or the advancement in artillery science. This thesis will identify any changes that were absorbed 
and whether these improved the army. 
It is to be noted that Western Europe is important to study, as the historiography studied within 
the Seven Years War focuses on other theatres of the conflict, chiefly America and Frederick 
the Greats campaigns in Central Europe. This lack of interest by British historians could 
possibly be due to the fact that the army in Western Europe was not chiefly a British one; nor 
was the theatre considered particularly important by the British government or featured any 
monumental battles such as Leuthen, Kolin or Kunersdorf. These features could be contributing 
to the lack of academic study within this area, a situation I would like to address. Coupled with 
this is the fact that enough has already been written on the analyses of the political, social and 
economic areas of this period in the Age of Enlightenment. Thus I believe it is necessary to 
return to traditional military history, which has long been neglected, and bring to light the 
successful actions of the British Army in Western Europe back into study. 
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Introduction 
 
The aim of this thesis is to study the British army in Western Germany during the Seven 
Years War. By analysing the battles fought by the army during the campaigns of 1758–
1761, I can investigate how the army conducted itself on the battlefield. Furthermore, 
using this timescale, with the battle of Vellinghausen in July 1761 as an end point, it 
will allow me to deduce whether there was any improvement within the army of its 
ability in combat. This will bring wider attention to the Western German theatre of war, 
and will also expand our knowledge of British military history and the army’s 
capabilities during this period. 
The thesis will be broken down into five chapters, with four looking at the 
composite sections of the army. The first section will investigate the line infantry, 
identifying how the foot infantry regiments were trained to fight as documented in the 
British regulations. We will then observe any changes that may have affected this style 
through the introduction of other works of literature, and ultimately report how the line 
infantry fought in Western Germany as compared to the regulations and literature. The 
second chapter on the cavalry will generally follow the format of the first, relating the 
regulations which documented how the cavalry fought and then observing any outside 
influences which may have affected this style; then describing how the cavalry actually 
fought, especially during the famous cavalry victory at Warburg, 31 July 1760. One 
concurrent theme we witness in these two chapters is changes in the army due to 
Prussian influences. Though Britain was an island, it was still affected by the changes 
that were sweeping through the European armies on the continent, and many of these 
innovations were either adopted or countered. This idea is explored in the third chapter, 
where a discussion of the development of British light infantry will be undertaken. As 
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there were no regular light troops in the British army at the advent of the Seven Years 
War, there were no regulations on this topic. Therefore, this chapter will observe the 
transformations that were happening in Europe, most notably with the adoption of light 
infantry formations to the Austrian and French armies, and determine how far the 
British army absorbed these changes or developed ways to counter them. As the light 
infantry was an area of the British army that went through a great deal of synthesis 
during the Seven Years War, we will analyse how the British army evolved light 
infantry units of its own, and how they were utilised in Western Germany. The final 
chapter will delve more deeply into the intellectual areas of warfare, specifically 
identifying how research into the ballistics revolution advanced the science of artillery 
warfare. This was tied together with the establishment of the Royal Military Academy 
at Woolwich, which provided cadets with substantial knowledge and training in the 
expanding science of artillery combat. The chapter will continue to observe the actions 
of the artillery in Western Germany, and determine how these intellectual advances 
enabled the artillery to be a significant force on the battlefield compared to previous 
wars the British army had fought in. The final chapter will be utilised as a case study. 
By identifying the events of the Battle of Vellinghausen, 15/16 July 1761, I can use 
them to observe what improvements were developed in the army. The battle of 
Vellinghausen is a crucial battle to study as it was one of the last major battles in 
Western Germany, and as such gives us a good understanding of what level of 
experience the army had reached after it had spent three years in this theatre. The 
improvements can be categorised into three sections: the skill development that comes 
with experiencing many campaigns, the development of new arms technology, and the 
establishment of new tactics and units that evolved the way the army fought. By 
utilising this approach I can better highlight any improvements that were developed 
throughout the war. 
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It was the books by Fortescue and Savory that provided me with the initial 
knowledge of events which piqued my interest in this period.1 My need to understand 
more about the understudied campaigns in Western Germany as opposed to those in 
America, or in Central Europe led me to develop this thesis. Though the aforementioned 
works provided a chronological description of the events of the war, I determined on a 
thematic approach so that I could investigate the aspects of the British army more 
closely. A greater amount of attention by historians studying the Seven Years war has 
been given to the areas of America and Central Europe, especially as several of the 
notable battles of the war were fought in these areas, such as the siege of Quebec, or the 
battle of Leuthen.2 Furthermore, as the general literature has a strong interest in the big 
figures of history in the other regions, such as James Wolfe or Frederick the Great, this 
has stunted research into Western Germany.3 Despite this, the characters who fought in 
Western Germany, who have attracted less research, were no less instrumental on the 
outcome of the war. This lack of study may have also stemmed from the nature of the 
Western German theatre of operations, as this region was considered secondary to the 
more important British war aims of protecting and expanding its overseas colonies, 
especially in America. Moreover, only a small proportion of the British army was sent 
to Germany, with the Allied army being composed mostly of forces from the many 
German states allied to Britain and Prussia.  Plus the Allied army was commanded by a 
German, Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick. This lack of a British focus may be the reason 
for the limited study of the British army in Western Germany, but it does not mean to 
                                                             
1 J.W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, vol. 2 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1899); Sir Reginald 
Savory, His Britannic Majesty’s Army in Germany During the Seven Years War (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1966). 
2 Examples include: Steven Brumwell, Redcoat: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755–1763 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002); Fred Anderson, Crucible of War; The Seven Years’ War 
and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766 (London: Faber and Faber, 2001); Franz 
A.J. Szabo, The Seven Years War in Europe, 1756–1763 (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2008). 
3 Stuart Reid, Wolfe: The Career of General James Wolfe from Culloden to Quebec (Staplehurst: 
Spellmount, 2000); Tim Blanning, Frederick the Great (London: Allen Lane, 2015). 
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say that the army was any less influential in this area. While the limited study on 
Western Germany has yielded some useful research into areas such as the logistics of 
the army, its welfare or its training, the combat factors have not been discussed.4 This is 
why this thesis is needed to fill in the gap in research by providing knowledge on the 
actions on the battlefield. For any future analysis of the Seven Years War, all sections of 
the war needed to be covered to provide a holistic study, something this thesis hopes to 
achieve. 
Despite the lack of discussion around this area in English language publications, 
there is a great depth of archival material from which to build an understanding of the 
actions of the British army. The State Papers at the National Archives in Kew are 
extensive and provide glimpses into the combat actions of the army, especially through 
the medium of general’s reports from the battlefield. Furthermore, after delving into the 
numerous archives at the British Library in London, several additional manuscripts have 
yielded a great deal of information detailing the events of the battles. A very important 
journal of the war found at this repository (anonymously attributed, but most likely 
written by Captain Fitzroy, aide de camp to Prince Ferdinand), provides great in-depth 
clarity of the many battles fought in the period of 1760-62.5 These sources have not 
been utilised in other works of literature, and give us other sources from which to cross 
reference the general chronological histories of the period.  
Though this study aims to describe the combat actions of the British army in the 
main battles of the war, the length constraints of this thesis leaves certain areas open for 
further questioning. Subjects such as the training of the army while on campaign, the 
logistics, and social-cultural factors, all of which may have affected the combat ability 
                                                             
4 H.M. Little, ‘The Emergence of a Commissariat during the Seven Years War in Germany’, Journal of 
the Society for Army Historical Research, vol.61 no. 248 (1983) 201–214; Erica Charters, Disease, War, 
and the Imperial State (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2014); J.A. Houlding, Fit for Service: The 
Training of the British Army, 1715–1795 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) 
5 London, British Library, ADD MSS 28551; London, British Library, ADD MS 28552. 
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of the army can not be sufficiently covered and so I will leave these topics for later 
research.6 
Ultimately this thesis will aim to cover the combat factors of the British army in 
Western Germany during the Seven Years War, investigating its several component 
parts and utilising the Battle of Vellinghausen as a case study to investigate whether 
there was any improvement within the British army during the period 1758–1761. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
6 For the training of the British army in the period see: J.A. Houlding, Fit for Service: The Training of the 
British Army, 1715–1795 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), however, he does not go into great detail on 
the training of the army during the Seven Years War in Western Germany. 
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Line Infantry 
 
The term Redcoat conjures a powerful image in the national consciousness of what 
embodied Britain during the eighteenth century; the all-conquering soldier who trekked 
miles over European battlefields and defeated numerous enemies of the country. The 
reality however is very different, providing a much grittier experience for any soldier 
who found himself in one of the many line infantry regiments. This chapter will 
investigate the way the line infantry was organised to fight as described in the 
regulations set down in the 1750’s, compared with how the line infantry actually fought 
in Western Germany during the Seven Years War. 7 Accounts from officers in the 
battles, such as Major Estorff and Captain Wilson, would lay witness to not only the 
success of the British infantry, but also the extreme hardships they had to suffer to gain 
the victory.8 Through investigating literature and the influence of certain officers, I will 
detail how the line infantry shifted their doctrine with respect to the platoon/alternate 
fire systems and how this enabled success on the Western German battlefields. The 
early successes of the British infantry in the first half of the eighteenth century, 
especially during the War of the Spanish Succession, solidified the British army’s belief 
in winning battles through maximising firepower. The improvements in firearms 
technology led to changes in battlefield tactics, as infantry regiments decreased their 
ranks to only three to take advantage of the flintlock’s improved fire rate, whilst the 
adoption of complex platoon firing systems enabled a process of continuous fire. The 
British system of platoon fire utilised by the army upon the assumption of the Seven 
Years War was influenced by the works of Humphrey Bland and Richard Kane, which 
                                                             
7 See: Anon, A system of camp discipline, military honours, garrison duty, and other regulations for the 
land forces etc (London: J. Millan, 1757), Anon, New Manual Exercise as performed by His Majesty’s 
Dragoons, Foot-Guards, Foot, Artillery, Marines, and by the Militia (London: J. Millan, 1758). 
8 London, British Library, Add MS 49606; London, British Library, Add MS 32894. 
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became a major focus of the 1750’s regulations.9 Meanwhile, in France, intellectuals 
such as Jean-Charles de Folard, François-Jean de Mesnil-Durand, and Maurice de Saxe 
began to write on the efficacy of speed and shock, through the use of columns instead of 
lines.10 This approach in overcoming the limitations of linear warfare was not adopted 
in Britain, as many believed that this system had given the British army success, while 
the French defeats in the wars of the early eighteenth century may have driven their 
intellectuals to search for new tactics.11 
By the advent of the Seven Years War, linear battle tactics had become the 
modus operandi in the eighteenth-century art of war. The tactics of British infantry 
warfare at the battalion level during the mid-eighteenth century were focused on 
bringing the battalion opposite the enemy and defeating them through the battalion’s 
firepower. The regulations state: 
In this Order the Battalion advances (in its Brigade) on the Enemy, the Officers taking 
care to preserve Silence among the Men; and when the General commanding the 
Brigade, or the Colonel, gives Orders to fire, the Officers to fire their Platoons as quick 
as possible, taking care that the Men level well, and present and fire together.12 
With the introduction of the flintlock musket, as well as the iron ramrod in the 
early part of the century, greater rates of fire could be achieved than previously.13 With 
the weaknesses of the reload time limited, armies took advantage of this by decreasing 
their infantry regiments ranks to three. With the cavalry limited by the topography of 
battlefields, linear warfare would usually witness a murderous firefight determined by 
                                                             
9 Humphrey Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline (London: Printed for John and Paul Knapton, 1753) 
as well as Richard Kane, Campaigns of King William and Queen Anne; from 1689 to 1712. Also, a new 
system of military discipline, for a Battalion of Foot on action (London: J. Millan, 1745). 
10 See Jean-Charles de Folard, Histoire de Polybe… Avec un Commentaire ou un Corps de Science 
Militaire (Amsterdam: Chatelain et Fils, 1753), F.J. Mesnil-Durand, Projet d’un ordre francois en 
tactique (Paris: Antoine Boudet, 1755) and Maurice Count de Saxe, Reveries or Memories concerning the 
Art of War (Edinburgh: Sands, Donaldson, Murray and Cochran, 1759). 
11 Armstrong Starkey, War in the Age of Enlightenment, 1700–1789 (London: Praeger, 2003) pp.52–53. 
12 Anon, A system of camp discipline, military honours, garrison duty, p.57. 
13 H.C.B Rogers, The British Army of the Eighteenth Century (London: Allen and Unwin, 1977) p.67. 
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the skill and bravery of the infantry.14 Platoon fire systems were subsequently 
introduced to maintain a constant level of fire, further mitigating the reload time. A 
system of continuous fire would also provide a sustained psychological shock on the 
enemy. Rather than firing one large volley which would leave the battalion with no fire 
in reserve, the platoon fire system would always ensure that part of the regiment was 
ready. The system utilised by the British army was described by Richard Kane in his 
work A new system of military discipline in 1745, and later copied down in the 
regulations described in the work A system of camp discipline, military honours, 
garrison duty, and other regulations for the land forces etc in 1757.15 The system began 
by dividing the regiment into four grand divisions. Kane describes how ‘Each Division 
[was] to be divided in four Platoons, which, with the Grenadiers will make up 
eighteen… The eighteen Platoons are to be divided into three Fireings, so that there will 
be six in each’.16 Once battle had been joined and a regiment had marched into firing 
distance of the enemy, the Colonel of the Regiment would order the first ‘fireing’ to 
discharge their muskets, followed by the second and third. This would allow each 
consecutive ‘fireing’ to fire, while the others were reloading, ensuring that always a part 
of the regiment were firing on the enemy. However this system was complicated and 
involved the men being split into sections that were not their usual companies. Having 
to listen for officer’s voices who may not have been familiar to them could cause 
confusion during the heat of battle. This breakdown of the regiment into the sixteen 
platoons plus the grenadiers continues to be supported in the later regulation: New 
manual exercise as ordered by his Majesty in 1758.17 The regulations called for the men 
                                                             
14 Claus Telp, The Evolution of Operational Art, 1740–1813: from Frederick the Great to Napoleon 
(London: Frank Cass, 2005) p.17. 
15 Richard Kane, pp.109–140; Anon, A system of camp discipline, military honours, garrison duty, pp.56–
57. 
16 Richard Kane, p.112. 
17 Anon, New Manual Exercise as performed by His Majesty’s Dragoons, Foot-Guards, Foot, Artillery, 
Marines, and by the Militia (London: J. Millan, 1758) p.5. 
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to ‘preserve their Fire till it will do certain Execution on the Enemy’, ensuring that the 
men came within suitable range of the enemy first before firing.18 This highlights the 
importance the regulations placed on the fire of the first volley. It further stated that the 
Officers in the platoons: 
Must likewise take care to keep their Men shouldered, and prevent their throwing away 
their first Fire, which as it is well rammed down, will in all probability do greater 
Execution than any of the succeeding Fires; for the Soldiers are apt, in the Hurry of 
Action, to neglect ramming down their Cartidges.19 
We observe this at the battle of Fontenoy, 11 May 1745,20 where the British infantry’s 
first volley shattered the French Gardes-Francaise, and indicated the effectiveness of 
the first volley fired by a regiment.21 The regulations focus on the regiment maintaining 
a fire superiority over their adversaries and to drive them off in this manner alone. It 
simply states that the platoons are to fire ‘as quick as possible, taking care that the Men 
level well, and present and fire together’.22 Further instructions were originally added in 
Richard Kane’s A new system of military discipline, only stating that if the Enemy 
maintained their ground, then the regiment was to march closer to the enemy and then 
begin firing again until the enemy was driven off.23 This highlights the importance of 
firepower in the regulations over attacking with the bayonet. Yet this was usually 
effective enough, as the French commented on how their own infantry were inferior to 
the British due to the superiority of its counterpart’s firepower.24 
                                                             
18 Anon, A system of camp discipline, military honours, garrison duty, p.57. 
19 Ibid, p.57. 
20 For a relation of the battle of Fontenoy see: Rex Whitworth, Field Marshal Lord Ligonier, The British 
Army 1702–1770 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958) pp.96–104. 
21 John Mancip White, Marshal of France: the Life and Times of Maurice, Comte de Saxe (London: 
Hamish Hamilton) p.159–60. 
22 Anon, A system of camp discipline, military honours, garrison duty, p.57. 
23 Richard Kane, pp.119–20. 
24 J.A. Houlding, Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715–1795 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1981) p.359. 
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In 1757 the New regulations for the Prussian infantry was introduced to a 
British audience. It provided a description of the platoon fire system known in Britain as 
‘alternate fire’ and added to the burgeoning discussion for this different system to be 
implemented into the British army. The alternate fire system was much simpler than the 
platoon system as it relied on the company as the basis for the divisions of fire. Instead 
of breaking the regiment into 18 platoons, the regiment’s eight companies (known as 
platoons in the Prussian army) would fire in successive order, rippling their fire from 
the flanks to the centre.25 This system would be simpler for the men to understand as 
they would still be under the command of their company officers, and so would 
understand who to listen out for in the havoc of battle.  
The Prussian regulations were supported by the influential work of Campbell 
Dalrymple: A Military Essay in 1760.26 The regiment’s firing system described in this 
work adhered to the Prussian style: ‘Every company being a platoon, and every two 
companies a grand division, there is no telling off; but the battalion is formed, and ready 
for action, the moment that the companies have taken up their ground.’27 However, as 
opposed to the Prussian system, his has the companies/platoons firing in a domino 
order, one after the other left to right.28 The alternate fire system had strong support 
from several officers in the British army, and had begun to be utilised by many 
regiments as early as 1755. The shift to alternate fire was vehemently objected to by the 
Duke of Cumberland,29 but his fall from grace after the battle of Hastenbeck allowed the 
change to be progressively adopted into the British battalions, especially those serving 
under General Mordaunt.30 During training for the amphibious expedition against the 
                                                             
25 Anon, New regulations for the Prussian infantry (London: J Rivington, 1757) p.34. 
26 Campbell Dalrymple, A Military Essay, Containing reflections on the raising, arming, cloathing, and 
discipline of the British infantry and cavalry (London: D. Wilson, 1761). 
27 Ibid, pp.88–89. 
28 Ibid, p.76. 
29 Prince William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland (1721–1765). 
30 General Sir John Mordaunt (1697–1780). 
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coasts of France in 1757, both he and his regimental officers, Lieutenant-Colonel James 
Wolfe and the Duke of Richmond,31 instituted this change into their infantry.32 Three of 
these regiments would be part of the first detachment of British troops in Western 
Germany.33  
The Prussian regulations also highlight the importance of attacking with the 
bayonet if the enemy did not retreat during the firefight.34  Campbell Dalrymple 
supports this and gives instructions for the infantry on how to attack in this style: 
The commanding officer may now repeat the word march, which will quicken the pace; 
and soon after give the word, charge with bayonet; when the men, at one motion, must 
bring the firelock down, so as to have it firm in hand, with the point of the bayonet 
breast-high… At the word charge, the whole rush forward, keeping ranks and files 
close, and well dressed, which practice will render easy […] if the enemy should not 
wait the charge, beat a ruff to halt, and preparative to make ready.35 
This willingness to attack with the bayonet is not featured in the earlier regulations and 
is more akin to the French literature which suggests the preference of cold steel over 
firepower. This should not be a surprise as Campbell Dalrymple’s work was influenced 
by the theories of Maurice de Saxe in his work Reveries or Memories concerning the 
Art of War.36 
The British infantry in Western Germany during the Seven Years War fought 
more akin to these later publications rather than the regulations. The Prussian influence 
is significant as it affected many facets of the infantries fighting style, such as the 
change to the alternate fire system, as well as grouping the grenadier companies of the 
                                                             
31 Charles Lennox, 3rd Duke of Richmond (1735–1806). 
32 David Blackmore, Destructive & Formidable, British Infantry Firepower 1642–1765, (London: 
Frontline Books, 2014) pp.132–33. 
33 These regiments were the 20th Kingsleys, 25th Edinburgh (Holme’s) and 51st Brudenell’s. 
34 Anon, New regulations for the Prussian infantry, pp.35–36. 
35 Campbell Dalrymple, p.80. 
36 Maurice Count de Saxe, Reveries or Memories concerning the Art of War (Edinburgh: Sands, 1759). 
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regiments into their own battalions. The first battle the British infantry were part of was 
the Battle of Minden on 1 August 1759, the British army having arrived in late 1758. 
The extended period of time from arriving to taking part in its first battle suggests that 
the army was not ready for combat when it arrived. In this time extensive training on the 
alternate fire drill was practised as prescribed by Lord Sackville, the British 
commander, as the military order books testify: 
It is recommended to the commanding officers to practise chiefly the alternate firing, 
firing from right and left by grand divisions, sub-divisions and platoons. His Lordship 
expects that the regiments will strictly conform to this order and that he shall not see for 
the future one regiment practising differently from another, and of course producing 
confusion in the service.37  
In fact Lord Sackville issued the regiments with a large amount of powder with which 
to train, the order books for 9 April 1759 stating: 
Lord George Sackville has ordered three barrels of powder to be brought to town for 
each battalion, each regiment is to keep 18 rounds per man and the best (?) powder, and 
may make use of the remainder to practise firings.38 
This extended period in which to practice the new alternate firing drill served the 
regiments well during the battle of Minden, where it was their firepower that defeated 
the French cavalry and infantry in the centre; Major Estorff commented on the vast 
amount of French casualties on the field were from the Gendarmerie and Saxon 
infantry, formations that the British infantry defeated.39 The letter from the Marquis de 
Contades to the Duc de Belle-Isle published in the London Chronicle gives a glimpse at 
the fighting style of the infantry at Minden. The letter states: 
                                                             
37 The Hon. Frederick Lindley Wood, M.L.S. Clements, S. Phillip Unwin, Historical Manuscripts 
Commission, Report of Manuscripts, vol. VIII (Hereford: The Hereford Times Ltd, 1913) pp.560–61. 
38 Ibid p.561. 
39 ADD MS 32894, fol. 75. 
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Alas! What availed us the gasconades published at Paris, of cannon and musquetry (sic) 
which would give fire immensely quick? [...] Our musquetry, indeed, fired faster and 
oftner, being discharged sooner, and at a greater distance; but the enemy reserved their 
fire till they discharged it in our teeth; by which means they did thrice the execution; 
and then rushing in with their bayonets, prevented our troops from firing away more.40 
This description furnishes us with several details, such as the reservation of the infantry 
fire until within suitable range, as the regulations called for, as well as the Prussian style 
attack with the bayonet after the initial volley fire. Both were utilised successfully and 
allowed the vastly outnumbered infantry to defeat their enemy multiple times.   
Discipline and morale upon the battlefield were crucial factors in the success of 
the British infantry. The infantry’s cool nature while under fire has been testified in 
many battles during the eighteenth century, including during the Seven Years War. The 
maintenance of discipline at Minden was one of the clear examples of this. The attack 
had come under the fire of two large French batteries as well as supporting infantry, and 
caused considerable carnage amongst the men, yet the ability to maintain order and 
discipline under this extreme psychological stress, especially in the knowledge that if 
the men broke they would be annihilated by the French cavalry is commendable. 
Captain Wilson, Aide de Camp to General Waldegrave, described how the ‘carnage was 
most dreadfull I ever saw’ yet the ‘true gallantry of our men cleared all’.41 Prince 
Ferdinand was so impressed with the British infantry that he gave them particular 
thanks in his orders of the day, and declared that ‘next to God he attributes the Glory of 
the Day to the Intrepidity and Extraordinary Good behaviour of these troops’.42 The 
infantry’s discipline and valour was witnessed in all the battles in Western Germany, 
                                                             
40 Anon, ‘A letter from Mons. De Contades to Marshal Belleisle, in answer to his published in the London 
Gazzette of the 18th August’, The London Chronicle, 11 September 1759, p.255. 
41 ADD MS 49606, fol. 69. 
42 Ibid, fol. 68, mention must be made that the British infantry were not the only troops commended, as 
the Hanoverian infantry who advanced under Sporcken were also given particular thanks. See also ADD 
MS 32894, fol. 74, for Major Estorff’s commendation of the Infantry under Sporcken. 
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such as at Vellinghausen, where Lord Granby stated how he could: ‘Never sufficiently 
commend the zeal and steady bravery of the troops. They not only showed the greatest 
spirit and resolution in action, but also the greatest patience and firmness during a very 
long and severe cannonade’.43 This discipline was influenced by the work of the officers 
and non-commissioned officers in the Regiment. Their actions in steadying the men, 
and keeping them in line, sometimes forcefully, enabled the infantry to maintain order 
in the field and keep fighting until the opposite side broke. Kane’s description of the 
officer’s placement best describes this: 
The Lieutenant-Colonel, or, in his Absence, the eldest Captain, posts himself eight or 
ten Paces from the Rear Rank opposite the Center, the rest of the Officers, posting 
themselves four Paces from the Rear Rank, extending to the Right and Left to cover the 
Battalion, where they will be of as great Use as those in the Front, in seeing that the 
Soldiers keep up in their Ranks and do their Duty.44 
Closing with the enemy was not laid down in the regulations but was a feature of 
both the Prussian regulations and Dalrymple’s work. This aggressiveness was applied in 
Western Germany, where there were multiple instances (apart from the previously 
described evidence at Minden) in which the British infantry closed with the enemy. At 
Vellinghausen on the 16 July 1761, the infantry engaged with the French in the close 
confines of the woods, as Corporal Todd describes: ‘We kept still Advancing through 
Bushes & thick Wood, very perteaguing, & Often the Enemy upon the Oneside & we 
upon the Other, which caused us to make use of our Bayonets very Oftens.’45 This could 
have been due to the confines of the wood, where the only way to engage the enemy 
was to attack with the bayonet. Duffy believes that attacks with the bayonet were rare 
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during the eighteenth century, and that they usually took place when the ‘normal 
relationships of space did not apply’, as in the assault of an entrenchment, town or 
wood, such as at Vellinghausen.46 Yet the actions of the Grenadiers at Warburg, where 
the fighting took place on an open hillside and valley, suggests otherwise. The two 
grenadier battalions of Maxwell and Daulhat had advanced to capture the hill and tower 
of the Heyenburg, a feature that commanded the flank and rear of the French army. As it 
was an important feature the French attempted to recapture the position which led to a 
protracted bloody engagement. An anonymous journal described how: 
The former [Maxwell’s regiment] was engaged with the Brigade of Bourbonnais, which 
it had forced back and was now advanced 300 yards beyond the Tower, where it took 
two pieces of the Enemy’s Cannon, and was pushing to make prisonners a group of 
French Officers who stood near them surrounding the Colours of their Regiment.47 
Though it omits any mention of attacking with the bayonet, the Grenadiers would have 
had to utilise these weapons to capture the colours from the French troops, who would 
most likely have defended them to the death. The creation of grenadier regiments was 
an adoption of the system employed by their German allies. The British grenadier 
regiments were developed by taking away the line infantry regiments grenadier 
companies and clumping them together into ad-hoc battalions, which would be used as 
elite shock troops in battle. The British grenadiers were repeatedly utilised by Prince 
Ferdinand to lead his forces into the attack to exploit a weakness, such as their actions at 
Warburg, or the surprise assault at the battle of Kloster-Kamp. The grenadiers were 
equally proactive in the final attack at the battle of Vellinghausen, as the anonymous 
journal describes: 
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About this time (9 in the morning) Prince Ferdinand ordered the British Grenadiers to 
pass the Landwher on the right and to gain the height so often mentioned which was 
instantly done the Enemy however had already quitted and were then entering the 
Wood; but being pursued by the Grenadiers who got immediately upon their flank […] 
their rear Guard was intercepted before it could reach the Village of Brunningsen where 
the greatest part of the Regiment of Rouge consisting of 4 Battalions with their Cannon 
& Colours were taken by Maxwells Battalion of Grenadiers.48 
However, the proactive attacking nature of the British infantry was not always 
witnessed on the battlefield. At Kloster-Kamp, 16 October 1760, the British infantry did 
not close with the French, instead following the British regulations style by relying on a 
protracted firefight. This ultimately negated the momentum the Allied army had 
achieved through its surprise assault.  The Baron Besenval suggested that both sides had 
not engaged in close combat as each forces casualties lay where they had fallen in 
opposing lines: ‘Le champ de bataille était jouché de morts, sans qu’on vit un seul 
uniforme des ennemis sur notre terrain, ni un seul uniforme français sur celui des 
ennemis.’49 The Allied army was not always on the attack, and two battles of the war 
indicate the defensive attributes of the infantry. At the battle of Corbach in 1760, the 
two battalions of Carr and Brudenell had to cover the retreat of the Allied army. This 
manoeuvre was an exceptionally difficult one, as attested by Richard Kane,50 who 
describes a system for retreat, by which the regiment would occasionally turn to fire 
upon the enemy when they came close. The rear guard action of the two battalions was 
successful, and merited ‘Prince Ferdinands thanks for their good behaviour’ though it 
was the supporting cavalry of Bland’s and Howard’s Dragoons that saved the infantry 
from being overwhelmed by the French light troops.51 Meanwhile, at Vellinghausen, 
                                                             
48 London, British Library, Add MS 28552 fol. 27. 
49 Baron de Besenval, Memoires du Baron de Besenval (Paris : Baudouin Frères, 1821) p.95. 
50 Anon, A system of camp discipline, military honours, garrison, pp.50–51. 
51 ADD MS 28551 fol. 21. 
21 
 
despite being drastically outnumbered, as the six British and two Hanoverian battalions 
faced a considerable portion of Marshal Broglie’s force, they managed to hold onto their 
defensive position on top of the Dinckerberg, launching several counterattacks 
themselves to sustain the position.52 
Despite the general belief that linear warfare of the eighteenth century was slow 
and cumbersome, several actions of the Seven Years War indicate that it wasn’t always 
the case. The pace of the advance at Minden put the French under great pressure; as 
they were unable to shift their reserves in a concerted effort to meet the oncoming 
attack, forcing them to retreat. Major Estorff reported how ‘Towards six o’clock, the 
Enemy surprised at the vivacity of our motions, lost ground, and folded with haste’.53 
Equally at Warburg, the Hereditary Prince’s efforts in quickly bringing his columns up 
and deploying them into line posed serious problems for the French commander the 
Chevalier de Muy, a journal describing: 
In the mean time the 2nd Column arrived leaving the Village of Ossendorff on its right 
and occupied the height where the 6 pieces of cannon were placed. The 4th Hessian 
Guards formed on the left of Scheither and the 3 Battalions of Brunswick Grenadiers on 
the left of them. All this was executed with surprising rapidity, the Battalions marching 
to the Attack as fast as they arrived.54 
However there were also several cases where the ponderous nature of the British 
infantry caused problems for the Allied army. At Warburg the main body of infantry 
could not advance quick enough to support the Hereditary Prince’s flank attack, as the 
boggy ground near the Dymel River, as well as the extreme heat, sapped the men’s 
strength.55 Furthermore, at the Battle of Kloster-Kamp the failure of the reserve infantry 
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to come up in time eventually cost the Hereditary Prince victory. While the Battle of 
Wilhelmstahl was notable for the lost opportunity of surrounding the French army, due 
to the slow advance of the British infantry.  
Ultimately, the British infantry developed for themselves a reputation of 
coolness in combat, coupled with a devastating fire delivered from their volleys. These 
factors had been developed in the wars of the Spanish and Austrian Successions, and the 
trend was to continue during the Seven Years War, with battles such as Minden and 
Vellinghausen heavily influenced by the actions of the infantry. By turning away from 
the regulations and adopting the alternate fire system, as well as utilising the aggressive 
nature of the British infantry, these factors regularly saw them succeed over their 
opponents, and ultimately identified the British infantry as a crucial part of the Allied 
army’s success in Western Germany. 
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Cavalry 
 
Though the efficacy of cavalry during the eighteenth century is much debated, the 
success of the British cavalry during the many engagements of the Seven Years War 
cannot be disputed. This chapter will investigate the cavalry tactics laid down in the 
British regulations, as well as several works that affected their style, ultimately relating 
how they fought in Western Germany compared to this literature. Making up only a 
small portion of the army’s numbers, as well as posing the problems of a high-
maintenance cost, this force could provide mobility and shock value in certain 
situations. The British cavalry of the late-eighteenth century were often regarded as a 
poor force, with the Duke of Wellington later issuing the famous judgement of how they 
would ‘gallop at everything’.56 However, they were not always that ill-disciplined. In 
Western Germany the cavalry would show a professionalism in their trade, yet also the 
aggressive dash that would go on to later typify their arm. Several accounts such as the 
anonymous journals of the war, as well as the reports by Prince Ferdinand of 
Brunswick, testify to the success of the British cavalry in battles such as Corbach, 
Emsdorff and Warburg.57  
Though the action between armies in the Seven Years War usually developed 
into a brutal firefight, a well-timed cavalry attack could unlock a stalemate. The famous 
attack of General Friedrick Wilhelm von Seydlitz’s cavalry at the Battle of Rossbach 
highlighted their continued importance on the battlefield. 58 As opposed to the infantry 
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battalion the basic unit of cavalry was the squadron, usually numbering 130–160 
officers and men.59 The squadron would be deployed in two lines, with enough of a gap 
between each line so that any injured or killed in the first rank would not hinder the 
movement of the second, but also close enough so that the momentum of the second 
rank would push the first one on in a melee. The whole mass of cavalry in a European 
army would usually be deployed on the flank in two lines, with a third line acting as a 
reserve. However, the British cavalry in the Seven Years War only deployed in two 
lines. This could have been a weakness if any of the cavalry engagements during the 
war had lasted for a protracted period, as the lack of the third line would have left them 
without the support to sustain an attack or exploit any breakthrough. Unlike the infantry, 
the first rank of cavalry was of great importance, as they were the first to engage and so 
would be composed of the best men.60 The Field-Dienst Regulament of the Austrian 
army called for ‘thoroughly good and reliable men who are mounted on sound horses’ 
in the first rank to provide the greatest amount of shock impact, while the Prussian 
cavalry mirrored this in its regulations calling for the tallest men in the first rank.61 The 
quality of the horses was of importance to the Duke of Cumberland, the British 
commander-in-chief,62 who issued commands only to obtain mounts between the height 
of fifteen hands–fifteen hands two inches ‘with light feet, and clean Sinewy legs’ who 
were ‘nimble and active movers’.63 This had been a similar development in the Prussian 
army, where Frederick the Great improved his cavalry by decreasing the large heavy 
horses and employing smaller, more nimble ones.64 In fact the quality of the British 
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horses is supported in the anonymous The beauties of nature and art displayed, in a 
tour through the world, where it states: 
The horses for the saddle and the chace (sic) are beautiful, and well proportioned: the 
draught horses are scarce to be matched anywhere: of these the British cavalry consists, 
which is reckoned the best for charging in the world.65 
While cavalry could be effective on the battlefield, it was usually limited by the 
geography of the area. The ideal topography for a cavalry battle was a flat plain, the 
stable ground enabling the velocity of horse and rider to deliver a crushing charge. Yet 
the Western German topography featured battlefields that were rarely flat with an open 
plain, and as such cavalry were usually relegated to casual observers as the infantry 
began their murderous firefight. Numerous cases, such as Bergen, Vellinghausen and 
Kloster Kamp, witnessed battlefields that were hilly and forested or featured obstacles 
such as a canal or boggy ground, which negated the use of the cavalry. Even in the 
famous victory for the 15th Light Dragoons (Elliot’s Regiment) at Emsdorff, the cavalry 
encountered difficult ground from which they could not engage; a journal describes how 
‘The Enemy continued their retreat over the River Klein by the Bridge of Blasdorff. The 
banks of this little River were morassy which made it impracticable for the cavalry to 
attack.’66 Only once Major-General Glaubitz’s67 Infantry had emerged onto the open 
plain towards Nider Klein was an attack facilitated. Furthermore cavalry rarely engaged 
each other due to the morale factor. The action of two sides crashing together and 
developing into a swirling melee was usually never seen, as one side typically panicked 
and gave way before coming together.68 The Battles of Emsdorff and Warburg are good 
examples of this, as the French cavalry fled on both occasions before contact was even 
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made.69 Cavalry were more willing to engage when directed against the flank of the 
enemy. At Warburg, Prince Ferdinand described how though the French cavalry ‘folded 
without waiting for the shock’, the remaining three squadrons of the Bourbon Brigade 
engaged the British as they were directed against the flank of Bland’s Regiment of 
cavalry.70  
The regulations for British cavalry combat prior to the Seven Years War were 
placed down in two works: Exercise for the Horse, Dragoon, and Foot Forces in 1728 
and the Duke of Cumberland’s Standing Orders of the Dragoons in 1755.71 It is in this 
latter work that the tactics for the charge are described. The attack was begun at a walk 
or slow trot, whereupon they would increase their speed to ‘a round trot at three score 
yards from the Enemy and never at a greater distance’.72 These orders, delivered circa 
1755, focused on attacking only at a fast trot, indicating a wish for order to be 
maintained throughout the attack rather than prioritising speed. The importance of order 
over speed was paramount, as the men were to form ‘close to the croop’, a designation 
which describes the cavalrymen being as close as possible when delivering the charge, 
which could only be achieved at a slow pace.73 The orders called for the cavalry to 
‘make a kind of Oblique half Wheel’ so that they could come down on the flank of the 
enemy squadron. It was unlikely this manoeuvre was successfully executed in combat 
given the low level of training within the British cavalry.74 With the advent of the Seven 
Years War, cavalry doctrine had changed very little since the War of the Spanish 
Succession. The 1728 regulations set down the common cavalry doctrine, which was 
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only touched upon in the later standing orders for the dragoons in 1755.75 Both these 
regulations focused on the regular day to day running of the cavalry, such as the 
manoeuvres while on parade or usual camp duty, but gave little attention towards the 
actions of the cavalry in battle. This is possibly due to the limited aspects of cavalry 
combat, the charge being relatively the only focus; As Houlding aptly describes: the 
‘role of the cavalry was well defined, its manoeuvres few, settled, and understood.’76 
These regulations were utilised in the War of the Austrian Succession, yet the poor 
performance of the British cavalry at the Battle of Dettingen, where many regiments 
refused to charge, fleeing before contact was made, indicated the cavalry needed further 
training.77 The call for a slow organised attack could have exacerbated these problems, 
the slow pace giving the men a longer period in which to decide they didn’t want to 
attack. Yet the better performance of the cavalry at the later battles of Fontenoy and 
Laffeldt indicate that training was the greater problem, something which must have 
been rectified by the experience of campaign.78 
Literature published in the late-1750’s and early-1760’s may hint at a shift in 
British cavalry doctrine that would affect their tactics during the Seven Years War. The 
Regulations for the Prussian Cavalry was introduced to a British audience through the 
translation by W.M. Faucitt in 1757.79 Being extensively sold around London by 
numerous publishers it would have gained a wide audience, especially as a vast amount 
of subscribers were cavalry officers.80 It was also extensively advertised in the local 
newspapers. This book would have provided knowledge of the Prussian system of a 
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cavalry attack, which could only have gathered greater support for use in the British 
army due to the notable success of the Prussian cavalry at the Battle of Rossbach in late 
1757.81 The Prussian regulations call for a much faster charge than what was prescribed 
in the British ones. The order for delivering the charge was as follows: 
At the distance of about fifteen paces, they are to fall into a strong trot; afterwards into a 
gallop, taking care to keep in close order, and continuing that pace as far as from ninety 
to hundred and twenty paces, where they attack the Enemy.82 
This attack would be delivered with much greater speed compared to the standard 
British attack. The aim was to attack at a gallop over a considerable distance while still 
maintaining order, a feature not previously performed by the British cavalry. This was 
something the Prussian cavalry had been training on throughout the 1740’s and 1750’s. 
The description of the charge is somewhat limited, only providing the bare essentials in 
describing the most important manoeuvre of the cavalry, but that is usual of many of the 
military manuals of the time, where greater emphasis was given to parade evolutions. 
However, a more substantial description of the Prussian cavalry charge is provided by 
General Charles Emmanuel de Warnery,83 one of King Frederick II’s Cavalry Generals: 
84 
At the first sound of the trumpet the whole begin to move forward, first and second line, 
and the reserve: The attacking wing perfectly dressed in line, marches on at a walk; at 
the second sound, which ought to be doubled, the whole begin to trot, (which the 
second line, and the reserve, continue to do till after the charge is finished) at the third 
sound, which is tripled, at about 150 or 200 paces from the enemy, the first line begins 
to gallop, and when they approach within 70 or at most 80 yards of the enemy, the 
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trumpets sound gay and lively fanfares and flourishes of the trumpet, then the troopers 
prick with both spurs, and push forward at full speed, without however entirely 
slackening the bridle, as all the horses cannot gallop with equal velocity; but when 
within about twenty paces, they must force their gallop as much as possible, to give the 
full impulse of the charge.85 
This emphasis on speed and shock is equally called for in Campbell Dalrymple’s 
A Military Essay. Written in 1761 it may support this shift in British cavalry tactics. 
Dalrymple writes how ‘The squadron should next practice the charge, and by degrees 
bring itself to do it with great rapidity, without opening of ranks or files’,86 mirroring 
the style eschewed by the Prussians. The constant training needed to maintain the high 
level of ability in the charge was a major factor in the Prussian cavalry, and was equally 
encouraged by Dalrymple: ‘The Charging in line must be very frequently practised, as 
every thing depends upon it.’87 Yet according to Houlding the British cavalry did not 
extensively train wartime manoeuvres and so one wonders how well the British cavalry 
were able to execute the galloping Prussian style attack over a considerable distance.88 
Connected to this, towards the end of the war the Earl of Pembroke, who became 
Lieutenant-Colonel in the 15th Light Dragoons in 1763, wrote a treatise by which to 
train the soldiers for the use of the cavalry. Through this, he laments the poor quality of 
cavalry training, rendering them inferior to their European counterparts: 
When the first regiment of light dragoons was raised under the command of my friend 
general George Augustus Elliot, we had frequent occasions to lament together the 
wretched system of Horsemanship, that at present prevails in the ARMY: A system, 
disgraceful in itself, and productive in its consequences of the most fatal evils: For 
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troops in their own nature most excellent and brave, have been frequently rendered 
inferior to less powerful ones, both in men and horses, for want of proper instructions 
and intelligence in this Art.89 
Rather than delve more deeply into the training of the cavalry, which will need 
further analysis that this thesis cannot sufficiently cover, I wish to return to the subject 
of the charge. Its description in Campbell Dalrymple’s work is more akin to the 
Prussian system than the earlier British regulations. Its format states: 
The troop should charge with swords only, till men and horses are both perfectly steady, 
which a very little time, after such preparation, will be sufficient to accomplish. It 
should charge at the trot, and lastly at the gallop, keeping ranks and files close, for till 
they can do that, they are deficient; they must particularly avoid pressing too much to 
the center, as too great weight thrown there, must either lame the men or break the 
squadron.90 
The last remark gives us an insight into the motion of a cavalry charge, as the press of 
bodies in the surge of a galloping attack could equally be dangerous for the men 
participating. The best example of this factor is given by Mottin de la Balme, who was a 
Captain in the Gendarmerie who charged the British Infantry at Minden: 
To begin with the advance had the effect of squeezing the centre, and then the wings 
felt the pressure… when we were only about fifteen paces away our horses tried to 
escape by throwing themselves to left and right. The force exerted by this phenomenal 
pressure became enormous […] Only a few men were killed by the enemy fire, but 
many suffered contusions or broken or dislocated limbs, and a number were suffocated 
or trampled under the horses’ hooves after falling from the saddle.91 
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All these factors would indicate that extensive training would need to take place 
to maintain a high level of standard for the cavalry, not only maintaining order in the 
attack but ensuring that this cohesion was not lost while undertaking the gallop over an 
extended distance. As no cavalry regulations were produced during the war, I have 
found no evidence for the extent to which these lessons were adopted into the army, so I 
can only surmise from the accounts of the battles the degree to which this new Prussian 
style was utilised. 
During the course of the Seven Years War we observe an adoption of the new 
Prussian doctrine, where galloping attacks began to be undertaken over greater 
distances. While the British cavalry was not utilised at Minden in 1759, we can discern 
a great deal from a statement made by Lord George Sackville, the British commander in 
Germany, about the tactics used at this battle: 
[I] Ever found the greatest difficulty in preserving intervals, or even the appearance of a 
line, without a considerable attention to their motions, and stopping the first appearance 
of irregularity. To attack with vigour and velocity, you must advance without hurry or 
confusion.92 
This suggests his utilisation of the standard British tactics, as Sackville was more 
interested in maintaining order within his squadrons, rather than moving with speed. 
This was anathema to Frederick the Great, who critically stated: ‘All movements of 
cavalry are swift. It can decide the fate of a battle in one instant. It must be used only at 
the right time.’93 This brings us to the famous event of the Battle of Minden, the 
inactivity of the cavalry. Whether you subscribe to the standard historical belief that 
Lord Sackville was the culprit in the vacillation of the cavalry, or Stuart Reid’s analysis 
supporting Lord Sackville’s actions, based on the testimonies from the court martial 
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reports,94 it is safe to say that the lack of a cavalry attack at the critical juncture of the 
battle diminished the Allies success.  
The Battle of Warburg provides us with the knowledge of the shift in tactics due 
to its contrast with Minden. An anonymous Journal describes how the advance was 
conducted ‘with surprising rapidity’ and that ‘The column continued its march rather 
quickening than slackening its pace, and being arrived at Meine His Lordship ordered 
the Line of Battle to be formed, still however keeping advancing.’95 Though this doesn’t 
describe how the charge was carried on in, the knowledge that the line of battle 
continued to increase its pace towards the French cavalry is very reminiscent of the 
Prussian style. The vigour of the attack possibly influenced the French cavalry retreat, 
as they perceived their opponents were more willing to engage with them, which could 
have affected their morale. Though the actions at Warburg seem to suggest this new 
approach, it would probably have been clear that they could not fully execute this style 
in the Prussian manner, because of their relative inexperience in conducting it. The 
squadrons would have lost cohesion fast when at the gallop over an extended period of 
distance, compared to the Prussian cavalry, who were able to maintain alignment at 
speed as they had gone through a period of a decade in trying to perfect this style. In 
fact riding drill was undertaken every day to maintain a high level of ability, something 
the British cavalry were not able to match.96 The lack of proper application of this style 
is inferred from an anonymous journal. In the final stage of the battle against Fischer’s 
Corps, the Journal describes how: 
In this attack the left squadron of Mordaunts received a full fire from the Enemy at the 
distance of 30 paces, by which Major Davenport, another Officer and some men were 
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killed. This was owing to having checked their horses at the instant they should have 
gone through the Enemy’s line.97 
The last sentence indicates that the men were travelling at a slower pace than at the 
gallop, as the men would not have been able to ‘check their horses’ had they been riding 
at full speed, otherwise they would have been crushed by the men coming up in the rank 
behind.  
The aggressive nature of the British cavalry was evident throughout the war, 
especially at the battle of Corbach. The desperate charge by Bland’s and Howard’s 
Dragoons, undertaken in the knowledge that they were vastly outnumbered by their 
opponents, rescued the rear-guard of the British infantry.98 This may indicate a zeal 
which wasn’t found in the French, who retreated at both Emsdorff and Warburg before 
coming to blows.  
Having dealt with the enemy cavalry, the British cavalry would then turn their 
attention towards the enemy infantry. The engagement of cavalry against infantry 
usually took place at the end of a battle, with the cavalry being especially effective 
against infantry who had broken from the supporting structures of their regiments.99 
This was shown most clearly by the 15th Light Dragoons at Emsdorff or the actions of 
Conway’s Regiment and Breidenbach Dragoons at Warburg, where they ‘attacked and 
drove the French cavalry and afterwards falling on the Swiss Infantry took Major 
General Lockman with the greatest part of the Regt. Of Planta prisoners.’100 However if 
the opposing infantry maintained its order, it was extremely difficult for cavalry to find 
any success against them. If the infantry held their fire to the last minute, delivering it at 
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a close range, this usually cut down the front rank of the cavalry, eliminating the shock 
impact of the horse. This would also then hold up the cavalry in the successive lines 
behind, as they would find it difficult to move past the barrier of injured men and 
horses. It was also hard for cavalry to cut their way through ranks of infantry who stood 
firm and presented a line of bayonet points. If the enemy infantry were organised, 
disciplined, and maintained their fire control, the cavalry would likely be repulsed. As 
Richard Kane stated: 
If we have Resolution to keep Order, and avoid Hurry, there is no reasonable Body of 
Horse dare venture upon us. It is not to be imagined, how the Fire of one Rank will stop 
and disorder Horse; and then a second, and a third on the Heels of it, will certainly send 
them packing.101 
Yet the effect of cavalry on a retreating enemy was profound, with no better 
example being that of the 15th Light Dragoons at Emsdorff. Having dispersed the enemy 
Bercheny Hussards earlier in the day they had reformed and tailed the retreating body of 
infantry under General Glaubitz, forming on the heights between Kirkhain and 
Langenstein with the aim of cutting off the French retreat. The French infantry are 
described as having formed in column, and due to the heat of the day and the previous 
forced march, the allied infantry had been unable to come up and support the cavalry. A 
Journal describes the attack as follows: 
Elliots Regiment formed on the Enemy’s right flank two deep in one Line, and then 
composed of four Squadrons, and when they had advanced within 100 yards of them the 
French faced and made ready and gave their fire at the distance of about 30 paces.102 
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The description of the French infantry delivering their fire at thirty paces is surprising, 
as it should have destroyed the oncoming first rank of British cavalry. One must 
therefore consider the psychological effects on a defeated force. The lack of accuracy in 
the French fire may be attributed to the panic induced by a cavalry charge on already 
dispirited infantry, who would be thinking more about escaping than fighting. This 
inaccuracy would have minimised casualties, allowing the front rank of cavalry to 
successfully use its speed and weight to smash through the French ranks. However, the 
journal also states: 
The different Squadrons attacked at the same instant, two in the center and one on each 
wing. The two attacks on the wings succeeded well, the cavalry going thro (sic) that in 
the centre met with greater resistance, the Dragoons not penetrating at the first instant, 
till they had fired their carabines in the Enemy’s faces when the regiment went fairly 
thro (sic) their line.103 
The success of the cavalry on the flanks suggests that the French infantry were 
already fleeing from the cavalry. This is inferred by the ease with which they broke 
through the body of infantry, as the cavalry would encounter less resistance due to the 
gaps created in the formation by the flight of the men. The journal’s description of the 
use of carbines indicates the light dragoons proficiency in using these weapons, a 
necessary skill they would have learnt for skirmishing in the irregular tactics they had 
been employed for. The Earl of Pembroke advised that horses should be trained to be 
still in combat, stating: 
All troop-horses ought to be very quiet and still to be shot off from, and taught to stop 
the moment you present; and not move after firing ‘till the rider demands it; this 
especially ought to be observed in the light troops; in short, the horses must be taught to 
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be so cool and undisturbed at it, as to suffer the rider to be free upon him, as if he was 
on foot.104 
The light dragoons were formed to provide similar services to the light cavalry 
in other armies such as picquet and patrol work, as well as covering the deployment of 
the cavalry on the battlefield. Their creation may have been influenced by the success of 
the Allied light cavalry such as the Prussian hussars or mounted elements of Freytag’s 
Jaegers. The British army created six light dragoon regiments during the war, though 
only the 15th light dragoons served in Western Germany, and were in fact specifically 
requested by Lord Granby.105 Having detailed their actions at Emsdorff, the 15th light 
dragoons were also successfully utilised in conjunction with the light infantry at 
Vellinghausen.106 Light cavalry forces could be extremely useful in engaging the enemy 
while they were in retreat, using their speed and manoeuvrability to engage the enemy 
at weak points. This was in fact what happened at the Battle of Corbach, when 
Howard’s and Bland’s dragoons were needed to throw back the French light cavalry 
who were hindering the rear-guard of British infantry. The pressure exerted by these 
men was enough to warrant the desperate charge led by the Hereditary Prince of 
Brunswick himself. Yet this example also shows the advantages Heavy cavalry had over 
light cavalry when in combat, as the vastly outnumbered two squadrons of dragoons 
threw back the more numerous ten squadrons of the Turpin Hussards and Beauffremont 
Dragoons. Despite their inferiority to heavy cavalry, the action of the 15th light dragoons 
at Emsdorff showed that light cavalry forces had become a useful force on the 
battlefield as opposed to previous wars.107 
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Ultimately, the Seven Years War witnessed a shift in the British cavalry’s 
tactical style. The Prussian influences were assimilated through the adoption of speed 
and shock, and the new innovation of light cavalry was copied from other European 
nations. The varying success of these influences is to be debated, especially as the 
change was in its early stages during the course of the Seven Years War, yet the success 
of the cavalry in its few engagements cannot be disputed. The inactivity of the cavalry 
at the later battles of Kloster-Kamp and Vellinghausen, means an evaluation of British 
cavalry efficacy in the later stages of the war cannot be appraised. Due to this we cannot 
identify whether the changes absorbed by the Prussian cavalry were fully assimilated, 
and utilised at a high level. Furthermore the efficacy of cavalry can be continually 
debated, as they were still limited by the topographical nature the battlefield, as well as 
creating a logistical burden on the army.108 Yet despite this the British cavalry’s 
successes in 1760, especially at Warburg, continue to highlight the importance cavalry 
could have on the outcome of a battle. 
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Light Infantry 
 
During the beginning of the eighteenth century, light infantry began to once more 
critically effect the outcome of battles and wars. The Austrian army’s successful use of 
irregular light infantry from their border provinces during the War of the Austrian 
Succession created a strong stimulus for military evolution. The armies that came into 
contact with these troops would invariably be at a disadvantage when trying to tackle 
their skirmishing skills. As such these armies attempted to copy them; the German 
forces providing their own jaegers, hussars, and the so called freikorps, while the 
French developed an array of irregular forces of their own.109 These new ideas about 
irregular warfare were well written on, with the best literature coming from Maurice de 
Saxe, M. de La Croix, and Thomas August le Roy de Grandmaison.110 
This chapter aims to deal with how the British army adapted to these new 
innovations and how though their European neighbours had been quick to adopt these 
new formations, the first half of the eighteenth century witnessed the British suffering 
from a lack of innovation. This slow process of reform was only begun during the 
Seven Years War, especially in America, as detailed by Stephen Brumwell.111 The 
disaster of General Braddock’s campaign towards Fort Duquesne, culminating at the 
Battle of the Monongahela, as well as the harshness of the topography and the irregular 
tactics of the natives, induced an evolution in British infantry tactics that would 
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eventually culminate in the 1771 light infantry reforms.112 This chapter investigates 
whether this evolution also took place in West Germany, where a completely different 
set of variables affected the warfare. The European campaign did not have the vastly 
wooded topography identified in America, nor the open-order tactics of the Native 
Americans.  Instead the British army would come up against the irregular regiments of 
the French army who would test their ability to perform in this new form of avant-garde 
warfare. Their answers to these problems are best illustrated in two works by J.A. 
Houlding and Peter E. Russell.113 They describe how the British Army tackled the 
problem of irregular warfare through the hybrid use of their grenadiers, as well as 
utilising Highlanders, who provided an ethnic element with a different military culture 
who could utilise ‘small-war’ tactics. I will investigate whether these systems worked 
effectively during the campaigns in Western Germany, or were more of a stopgap 
before further evolution was needed.  This would highlight the inadequacies of the 
British Army in dealing with these problems, also identifying whether there was a 
stagnation in reform compared to the changes being conducted in the ‘American Army’. 
With the advent of the eighteenth century, most notably during the War of the 
Austrian Succession, light infantry once again came into the fore, utilising their 
skirmishing ability and fluid tactics to affect the course of a battle. Houlding describes 
how the Austrian development of light infantry originated from the Balkan nobility 
employing ‘bands of these rough Slavic frontiersmen to suppress bandits and Turkish 
raiders’.114 Many of these provincial troops answered Maria Theresa’s call for help 
during the War of the Austrian Succession and wreaked such havoc on her enemies that 
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they in turn developed ways to defend against them.115 As C.T. Atkinson details ‘not 
only the Prussian Army, but those of other German Princes found themselves compelled 
to pay the Austrian light troops the compliment of imitation’,116 as they developed their 
own formations of irregular jaegers, freikorps and hussars. The French, in turn, having 
encountered the pandours and hussars in Bohemia, Alsace and the Low countries, 
developed their own formations. The French formed units called Volontaires, 
Compagnies Franches and Hussards, one of whom was the famous Regiment de 
Grassin, who were used to skirmish in open order against their enemies.117 These troops 
were trained to use any cover provided by the terrain, with the fire being: 
Voluntary, aimed, and not coordinated by orders. This tactic was referred to as 
dibandade, literally meaning “helter skelter” and referred to the frenetic quality of the 
fighting, which was totally left to the capabilities, and initiative of the individual 
soldier.118 
The adoption of these irregular tactics were further encouraged through the 
experimental training conducted by the French Army during the early part of the 
eighteenth century. By utilising ‘camps of instruction’ (a form of practical field 
training) the French practiced merging light infantry tactics with regular closed order 
tactics. They attempted this by forming platoon-sized piquet’s in each battalion who 
would provide a screen for an advance, occupying any ‘advantageous terrain such as a 
hedge, mill, or the border of woods’.119 Maurice de Saxe had already posited that the 
fire from these light troops: 
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Would be more effective than anything that could be dished out by the line troops using 
‘volley fire’, suggesting that the advantage of taking time to aim your fire was far more 
effectual than blasting out a large volume of fire from the regiments.120  
The British themselves were not isolated from these experiences. The Austrians 
had been allies in the Low Countries, and many officers witnessed first-hand the 
advantages of having light irregular troops at an army’s disposal. Though light troops 
were generally used in the ‘small-war’ of a campaign, their unique skill set also made 
them useful on the battlefield. The best known example was of the actions of the 
Regiment de Grassin during the Battle of Fontenoy.121 The British Army’s mistake in 
not clearing this regiment from the wood of Barry brought dire consequences during the 
battle, as their well-aimed withering fire on the infantry columns flank caused 
considerable losses. A body of British light troops could have effectively skirmished 
with the enemy, forcing them out of the wood, thereby decreasing the loss caused to the 
rest of the army. As we have seen from adjustments made to the French and German 
armies, the lack of provincial irregular allies should not be an excuse for the lack of 
British light infantry. 
The rebellion of 1745 also brought many examples from which the army could 
have learnt irregular tactics and applied them. After their defeat in open battle at 
Culloden, the Highland forces under Charles Edward Stuart conducted guerrilla warfare 
against the redcoats, using the wild terrain of the highlands and their agile ability to 
skirmish and then retreat. Evidence shows that the British adapted to these new methods 
of warfare, though in limited capability. They utilised their own pro-government 
Highland clansmen to provide a screen when advancing, as well as troops bound for 
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America, such as the Georgia Rangers.122 The British infantry also became experienced 
in conducting raids against the Highlanders, due to the practice of fighting in the 
mountains for many months.123 Ultimately then the experience on campaign gave the 
army many chances to adopt to these new tactics, as Russell stated ‘an examination of 
military operations in Europe and Scotland, where those commanders had gained their 
experience in the 1740s, reveals that they had ample opportunities to observe, combat, 
and occasionally to conduct guerrilla tactics.’124 
Meanwhile, during the 1750’s a new niche market on the subject was developing 
in military literature, especially in France. Extensive works were written on the tactics 
for not only defending against partisan attacks, but more importantly how to conduct 
them. Most of these works were written by French officers who had extensive 
experience in irregular warfare; most of the authors having participated in the actions 
conducted by the early light troop formations during the War of the Austrian 
Succession. M. de La Croix’s work Traité de la Petite Guerre,125 published in 1752, 
was the first document which provided insight into how to conduct irregular warfare, 
based on his experiences with the Compagnie Franches. In the work he provided details 
on many aspects of the little war, such as conducting night attacks, ruses to successfully 
attack superior forces, and the importance of the soldier’s confidence in their officers. 
The most famous work was by Maurice de Saxe, entitled Mes Reveries, where he 
tackles many of the topics also discussed by La Croix.126 Further writers such as 
Thomas August le Roy de Grandmaison, M. De Jeney, and Turpin de Crisse added 
further description to the burgeoning intellectual discussion on this military topic.127 
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Several focuses of their work detail the attributes a partisan must exhibit, being ‘robust 
and strong as can be procured’,128 as well as focusing on earlier ideals of meritocracy in 
selecting officers.129 An emphasis was made in both De Jeney’s and Grandmaison’s 
works on the importance of understanding the geography of the region, going so far as 
to advise employing a geographer in your force, so that accurate reconnaissance of the 
topography could be made for the armies use.130 This would have been extremely useful 
at the Battle of Hastenbeck, when General Chevert’s131 light troops discovered the 
woods and hills on the allied left flank were devoid of troops, and that the ground was 
also suitable to deploy on.132 This intelligence was critical in winning the battle for the 
French. These literary works were extensively sold in London, imported by a few 
publishers such as C.G. Seyffert and Paul Vaillant, yet despite this none of them had 
been translated in the 1750’s. Though many officers could read French, a translation 
may have allowed a much wider reader base, especially as these books were not 
extensively advertised in the papers.133 This suggests that there was a market on this 
military topic for British readers, yet none of the lessons that could have been derived 
were adopted into the British army. 
Despite this influx of French literature on the topic, the subject matter was not 
mirrored in British literature. Though Humphrey Bland’s work A Treatise of Military 
Discipline had a chapter dealing with the problems of partisan attacks and how to guard 
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against them, the descriptions were more reactionary, rather than giving advice on 
developing their own irregular tactics.134 An important military treatise for the British 
army during the period, his work would have been well read and, as such, many officers 
would have gained insight on the limited actions to deal with irregular warfare. Bland 
seems to have a low opinion of these tactics, stating ‘though the Danger from such 
[irregular] parties cannot be very considerable yet the neglecting them may occasion 
you the loss of all your stragglers, your Baggage, and perhaps your Rear-Guard.’135 This 
lack of discussion on irregular warfare was also observed in Richard Kane’s work A 
New treatise of Discipline, which details how a battalion of infantry must function on 
the battlefield.136 By its omission of any description of light infantry, it suggests that the 
infantry did not fight in this capacity, neglecting any tactics for dealing with skirmishers 
during the campaign or on the battlefield. Despite the two main works giving little 
attention to the topic, Samuel Bever’s work The Cadet, A Military Treatise by an 
Officer noted down many translated military maxims from the continent, with one 
section dealing with Saxe’s discussion on irregular attacks during a march.137 This work 
was aimed at officers joining the army, and may have given them a brief introduction 
into the partisan warfare of the time, to any who had not already ingratiated themselves 
with the French manuals. Overall, the blossoming scholarly discussion upon irregular 
forces during 1750–60 was such that the British army could not have been ignorant of 
it. Yet none of the major British works discuss how to actively engage in irregular 
warfare, nor were any of the lessons assimilated into the army from the French works. 
This could be a major reason as to why we see the army being poorly prepared to deal 
with this type of warfare at the start of the Seven Years War, to the extent that 
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Grandmaison advises targeting the British forces on campaign due to their inability in 
dealing with this type of warfare.138 
Considering all the knowledge and experiences gained in irregular warfare prior 
to the Seven Years War, what changes did the British army adopt to utilise this way of 
war? To talk about light infantry in Western Europe, one must first touch upon the light 
infantry revolution initiated in America. The two theatres were not separate of each 
other, and we shall see some of the lessons the ‘American Army’ learnt applied in 
Europe. After the disastrous campaign of General Braddock against Fort Duquesne, 
culminating in the Battle of the Monongahela, the British had begun to realise the 
importance of irregular warfare in the deeply forested and mountainous topography of 
North America. British redcoats were unaccustomed to this type of warfare, and as such 
this ‘guerrilla warfare made a profound impression on troops whose peacetime training 
catered exclusively for the ritualistic combats characteristic of the open European 
battlefield.’139 The early use of Rangers and Native allies provided the frontier tactics 
evident during the long ranged patrols conducted during this theatre. Russell best sums 
it up when he states ‘frontier tactics depended on small, mobile bands of woodsmen 
who used surprise attacks  to create confusion, concealment to nullify enemy fire, and 
flexible alignments to reduce the effects of counterattacks.’140 However, these units lack 
of discipline brought about the creation of the light infantry companies.141 As early as 
1758 these light companies were being introduced, whereby ‘each regular battalion was 
to furnish 30 or 40 men’142 to be used as light infantry, where they would be trained in 
skills such as ‘marksmanship, “running and leaping”, firing independently from 
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cover’.143 As seen before in the experiments by the French, though utilised far more 
extensively, the British light infantry were used in the same manner. They aimed to 
seize ‘every commanding ground till the line has passed’144 and would ‘concentrate on 
harrying the enemy’s flanks and mounting an active pursuit. Should the army be 
attacked while forming up, the light infantry would provide cover “by skirmishing to 
check the enemy”’.145 The following quote from the Orders issued to the light troops 
before the campaign upon Louisbourg, expertly describes an early account of light 
infantry doctrine: 
The Commander of the Light troops must teach his Corps to attack & to defend 
themselves judiciously always endeavouring to get upon the Enemy’s Flank, and 
equally watchfull to prevent them surrounding them: They must be instructed to chuse 
good Posts, & to lay themselves in ambuscade to advantage […] They must always 
march in [single?] Files, & generally fight in a single rank; pushing at the Enemy when 
they see him in confusion, and that the Ground favours their efforts; never pursue with 
too much eagerness, nor to give way, except in a very great inequality of numbers.146 
Ultimately, the men in the light company were increased and proved to be valuable, 
especially in the capture of Louisbourg and Quebec, such as when they scaled the cliffs 
and drove in the French/Canadian piquet’s at the beginning of the Battle of the Plains of 
Abraham147. These actions garnered extensive praise from their officers.148 Though their 
creation had been to deal with the Native Americans and French/Canadian irregulars, 
combat experience had shown that the ‘light infantry evolved within the “American 
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Army” had proved equally useful against more conventional opponents’.149 As such 
could their lessons be transitioned over to the army in Germany? 
Upon the start of the campaign in Western Germany, we have already seen how 
little had been done to adapt the British army in Europe concerning the new methods of 
irregular warfare. By the beginning of the campaign the lessons learnt in America had 
not been transitioned over to Europe. Time constraints may give us an explanation, as 
the lessons in America were only fully applied at the time of the Siege of Quebec, 
comparatively the same time as the Battle of Minden in Germany. The army did have 
limited methods to combat these new tactics during the early stages of the campaign. 
One method was the utilisation of picquets and quarter guards as ad-hoc skirmishers or 
for reconnaissance. As John Gittins states ‘The Picket Guard is a Body of Men always 
to be ready, lying with their arms in their Hands, to turn out in case of an Alarm.’150 
Each regiment had ‘One Captain, two Subalterns, three Serjeants, and Fifty Men’ for 
this task, who would be rotated every twenty-four hours. 151 Once the quarter guard (an 
advanced post, numbering far fewer men than the piquet) were alerted by the enemy’s 
presence, they would give alarm by firing their muskets, at which the picquet would 
form up in front of the camp and then march out to assist. If the enemy continued to 
advance, the picquet would deign to hold off the enemy long enough for the army to 
form up ready for battle. This was most evident at the Battle of Vellinghausen where the 
picquets slowed the advance of Marshal Broglie’s columns. This suggests that this 
system was still utilised late into the war. Fortescue details how Lord Granby’s force 
was so unprepared for Broglie’s advance that they ‘had only just time to seize its arms 
and turn out, leaving the tents standing; the Highlanders indeed hardly emerging from 
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their tents before the French guns opened fire on them.152 Fortescue’s words indicate 
that the system had not worked efficiently enough, or that the men were not attentive to 
their duty. However, the journal of Corporal Todd, dated 13 July 1761, indicates 
otherwise: 
We had strong Picquits who patrolled in every Corner as a report being spread 
throughout our whole Army that a Suspension of Arms or a peace was near at Hand, 
which was done by the Insinuation of the Enemy in Order to make us Less Delligent & 
Attentive in our Duty. It was recommended to us by Lieutt General Conway not to give 
any Credit to it until H.S.H. Prince Ferdinand himself had Declared it in Orders, but to 
keep ourselves Alert upon all Occations.153 
Todd continues to describe how the Prussian hussars warned the outposts that Marshal 
Broglie’s force was advancing upon them, the time given at three in the afternoon, 
whereupon a messenger was sent to Lord Granby. He states how: 
Our Drums was Order’d to beat to Arms, & Every Pioneer to quit his work & fall into 
his ranks, as we were not above 500 Men, both Advance Guards & Pioneers in all. We 
formed the line as far as we could stretch in Length […] And in this posture we 
remain’d until 4 O Clock in the Afternoon.154 
These statements disagree with Fortescue, as they show that the advanced posts knew of 
the arrival of the enemy and were well prepared, which indicates their ability at 
reconnaissance. However they give us no clue as to whether the picquets were adept at 
utilising open-order warfare in the manner of irregular forces. Considering that the 
Battle of Vellinghausen was fought on the 15–16 July 1761, the lessons learnt in 
America could have been disseminated to Germany, though I have currently found no 
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evidence of this. Given the topography, this small band of men if properly trained in the 
ways learnt in America, could have inflicted considerable damage upon the advancing 
French forces; using the trees and undergrowth to conceal themselves and skirmish with 
the enemy, they would have limited their own losses while still achieving their objective 
of holding up the enemy. 
The other method of dealing with irregular tactics comes from the military 
treatise set out by Humphrey Bland in his book A Treatise of Military Discipline. He 
describes the use of the battalion’s grenadiers to deal with the enemy skirmishers: 
When the Enemy act upon the Defensive, and only endeavour to maintain their Post, if 
there are any Houses, Hollow-ways, Ditches, or Hedges in their Front, they commonly 
place Men in them to annoy the Line in their marching up to attack them. When this is 
the Case, the Granadiers [sic] should be ordered to march 30 or 40 Paces before the line, 
either in single Companies or Join’d, as the Service may require, in order to dislodge 
those Advanced parties that the line may not be ruffled, or interrupted in their marching 
up to attack.155 
This suggests a method whereby the grenadiers were utilised to counter the enemy’s 
irregular forces, by dislodging them from important positions upon the battlefield. This 
could be due to their greater athleticism compared to the other men of the battalion, 
considering that these men were usually the largest and strongest. However, the manual 
does not indicate whether the grenadiers were trained in irregular warfare, the method 
proscribed being reactionary rather than a proactive use of these new tactics; the aim 
being only to dislodge the enemy from these advantageous positions, not occupy them 
themselves or continue to screen the advance or skirmish with the enemy. However, one 
aspect of the tactics adopted from the Prussians negated this use of the grenadiers. 
When on campaign the British army joined its battalion grenadier companies together 
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into separate grenadier battalions. These could then be used as a strike force or tactical 
reserve, but which at the same time left the line battalions without their ability to deal 
with any irregulars in the manner detailed before. The only evidence of the grenadiers 
being used in an irregular fashion comes from the descriptions of the Battle of Warburg. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Beckwith stormed the heights of the Heyenberg at this battle with 
only twenty-four grenadiers, skirmishing with the Bourbonnais brigade where they 
‘sustained their fire with a firmness worthy of admission, till such time as they were 
supported by the two battalions of British Grenadiers’.156 These men kept up a desultory 
fire to impede the French progress in capturing the hill, a most important topographical 
feature of the battlefield, which once captured opened up the French left flank. 
Having detailed the pre-war British light infantry tactics, what systems did the 
British adopt during the course of the West German campaign? One feature was the use 
of newly recruited Highland regiments, due to the successes of the 42nd, 77th, and 78th 
Foot (Highlanders) in America during early 1758. Two more Regiments, the 87th 
(Keith’s) and 88th (Campbell’s) Highlanders were formed for use in Europe in late 
1759. C.T. Atkinson states that ‘their achievements under Prince Ferdinand of 
Brunswick and the Marquis of Granby during the Westphalian Campaigns of the Seven 
Years War have also a certain importance in the development of British Light 
Infantry’157, though he does not relate how they were used in this manner during the 
war. The Highland military culture featured many irregular tactics, utilising the broken 
terrain of Scotland for guerrilla warfare in times of need. This specific skill set would be 
observed during the ‘small-war’ of campaign, such as their actions against 
Beauffremont Dragoons during the winter of 1759, where they launched a successful 
night attack supported by Luckners Hussars, a feature of partisan warfare La Croix 
                                                             
156 London, British Library, ADD MS 28551 fol. 43 
157 C.T Atkinson, p.208. 
51 
 
would have strongly supported.158 Their actions greatly impressed Prince Ferdinand, 
who pressed for an increase in their numbers.159  
There are only three major actions in which the Highlanders fought during the 
Western German campaign. Considering that for the most part of the Battle of Warburg 
the Highlanders were held in reserve, the Battles of Kloster-Kamp and Vellinghausen 
are our only case studies to assess them. With no account providing in depth 
information on their actions during the battles, it is hard to assess to what degree the 
Highlanders utilised irregular warfare as conventional light troops, especially as the 
only account by a regimental leader is sparse in its detail.160 However many inferences 
can be made upon their use in this way. At Kloster-Kamp, the small detachment of 
Highlanders was given the task of attacking Fischer’s Corps at its advanced post at the 
seminary of Kloster-Kamp.161  This action is similar to what was required of the light 
troops in the French literature, indicating their use in this partisan fashion. Furthermore, 
the Highlanders were the advance guard of the Hereditary Prince’s forces, indicating 
that they would be thrown forward to cover the advance, a position usually given to 
irregular troops. At Vellinghausen the topography was even more suited to a conflict 
between light forces. The broken wooded terrain of the north matched with the marshy 
ground of the south providing excellent cover and concealment. The Highlanders were 
used to sustain the outposts and Hessian Chasseurs who were pushed furthest forward. 
In fact the lack of definitive reconnaissance from these men, resulted in conflicting 
intelligence about Marshal Broglie’s successful flank attack. Yet their success in 
pushing back the Volontaires de Saint-Victor, possibly in a skirmishing fashion, 
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matching light infantry with its equal, protected Lord Granby’s exposed left flank.162 
Another clue to their ability in open-order warfare comes from Corporal Todd’s 
Journal. He states that upon their outposts conflict with the French columns ‘Two very 
Nimble Serjeants belonging the Highlanders skipped from tree to tree very near the 
Enemy, & fired several Shotts’, mirroring the actions that the light infantry in America 
would have taken to combat the enemy. Unfortunately the fact that only two of the 
Highlanders seem to have done this is discouraging, as it does not give us enough 
evidence to believe that the whole unit was able to utilise these tactics. An anonymous 
source reported that ‘His Serene Highness was then obliged to content himself with 
detaching the light troops in pursuit of them’.163 Since the Highlanders were included in 
the troops following up the retreating French it would support the belief that they were 
classed as light troops. Though there is no definitive evidence for the Highlanders use in 
this manner, their actions at Kloster-Kamp and Vellinghausen gave the British army two 
regiments who could be utilised in this style. 
Unlike America, where the army felt it necessary to develop its own units of 
light infantry, the army in Western Germany could rely on its allies. There was no 
desperate need to evolve as the light troops of the German armies could cover the 
British army’s deficiencies in this area. The adoption of the Legion Britannique into the 
British army’s pay allowed them to utilise these units who were accustomed to fighting 
in irregular warfare. At Vellinghausen the Legions two battalions supported the 
Highlanders in defending the extreme left flank of Lord Granby’s force. The other 
German light troop formations were used extensively in cooperation with the British 
army throughout the war, such as Freytag’s Jaegers at Emsdorff, or the Hessian 
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Chasseurs at Vellinghausen. They provided all the elements of the ‘small-war’ that the 
British army could not. 
It is after Vellinghausen that we see the first lesson which may have been learnt 
from America. Fifty men from each battalion of the Foot Guards were chosen to form 
chasseurs and from these a converged battalion was formed named “Frasers 
Chasseurs”. 164 This system was very similar to the light infantry companies that were 
created in America. Considering the fact that it was only instated in late 1761 highlights 
an unwillingness to experiment in Germany, especially since excellent results had been 
observed in America during late 1759. This was ample time for which to introduce it to 
the West German theatre, a fact even more damning considering that the French army 
under Marshal Broglie were instituting these changes to their own army from late 1760 
onwards, despite the fact that it was the British Army who had witnessed its excellent 
results in America. 165 
Ultimately, the British light infantry in Germany was a story of limited success. 
With the advent of the Seven Years War, the British army had not developed to 
accommodate the new tactics that had spread throughout the other German nations. This 
left them underprepared to face the new type of irregular warfare. As such the army had 
to develop new formations quickly to cover the lost time, such as the creation of the 
Highland regiments. The use of allied light troop formations supported the British 
army’s weaknesses, but ultimately it was a case of limited change within the army who 
had not adopted the valuable lessons learnt from America until late in 1761. It is of no 
consequence that the eventual creation of the proper light infantry companies only came 
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with the reforms of 1771, thus indicating the army’s unwillingness to reform even when 
confronted with the value of troops that had become integral to the ability to wage war. 
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Artillery 
 
The British artillery in the eighteenth century was a rapidly improving force that 
coupled mathematical intelligence with the science of gunnery to great effect during the 
Seven Years War. In this Chapter I aim to evaluate the artillery’s capability during the 
war, analysing their combat ability on the battlefields of Western Germany, and link the 
expanding mathematical science behind it that developed the force into one of the most 
effectual branches of the army on the battlefield. Military science was a whole new 
breeding ground for intellectual thought during the eighteenth century; along with 
advances in geometry, calculus and physics the mathematicians of Britain were 
beginning to make a name for themselves in the discoveries on ballistics, such as the 
work New Principles of Gunnery by Benjamin Robins.166 This work dealt with the 
problems of ballistics velocity and the effect of air resistance on bodies in flight and was 
influential enough to gain Leonhard Euler’s attention in Prussia. Brett Steele’s work 
describes the theoretical literature that pushed forward the investigation into ballistics 
during this period, 167  while Niccolo Guicciardini builds upon this in his work The 
development of Newtonian Calculus in Britain, 168 where sections deal with how 
advances in theoretical mathematics were introduced into educating the military. This 
chapter aims to develop this further, moving away from a purely mathematical 
standpoint and instead investigating how the Royal Military Academy Woolwich tied 
all this knowledge together into educating the cadets and preparing them for a service in 
the artillery. 
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The general perception of artillery in the eighteenth century was that it was not 
the dominant battle winning force of later centuries. Technology had not advanced far 
enough to allow the indirect fire and extreme ranges that became the common features 
of modern warfare. However, the destructive capacity of artillery at the time should not 
be underestimated, nor its ability to effect the outcome of a battle. As Richard Holmes 
states ‘a battery firing canister at 600 yards had the same effect on its target as a 
battalion firing volleys at 100 yards,’169 something that would be demonstrated during 
the important battle of Minden. The weapon that would be integral in Napoleonic 
warfare was no-less important during the Seven Years War. Baron Jomini perfectly 
sums up the considerable effect artillery had on the battlefield: 
Artillery is an arm equally formidable both in the offensive and defensive. As an 
offensive means, a great battery well managed may break an enemy’s line, throw it into 
confusion, and prepare the way for the troops that are to make an assault. As a defensive 
means, it doubles the strength of a position, not only on account of the material injury it 
inflicts upon the enemy while at a distance, and the consequent moral effect upon his 
troops, but also by greatly increasing the peril of approaching near, and specifically 
within the range of grape.170 
Prior to its achievements in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the notable effect 
artillery had on the battlefield during the period of ancien regime warfare has been 
understated by historical literature. The lack of study stems from the dearth of first-hand 
accounts, as well as the limited reports on the artillery from the commanders, thereby 
stunting greater discussion. This forces the historian to utilise less accessible forms of 
sources to critically analyse the artillery. The vast and complex records of the Board of 
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Ordnance make it time consuming to cover, thus the limited study undertaken here 
could not hope to sufficiently address these records to achieve a full analysis. 
The Royal Regiment of Artillery was formed in 1716, yet the artillery in the first 
half of the eighteenth century was considerably different compared to the artillery of the 
Seven Years War. To compare the audacity and efficiency displayed by the Royal 
Regiment of Artillery in the Seven Years war to its forbears of only half a century 
before paints a dramatically different picture. The artillery had undergone very little 
improvement since the time of King Henry VIII,171 in fact though a regiment had been 
formed in 1697, artillery in the first half of the eighteenth century was still formed along 
the same lines as that Tudor Monarch.172 When a campaign began the Board of 
Ordnance would organise special trains.173 These trains would constitute the guns, staff, 
and men brought together from around the varying fortresses of Britain to use on 
campaign. Usually this was a slow process and involved little uniformity, which 
resulted in poor organisation. 
Prior to the Regiments formation, the artillery had fought during the War of the 
Spanish Succession, from 1701–14. The artillery’s composition and utilisation varied 
considerably from its later incarnation during the Seven Years War. The guns were 
cumbersome weapons similar to those used in the Seventeenth Century. The field guns 
were pulled into position on the battlefield by teams of up to eight to ten horses, needed 
due to their extreme weight of up to three tonnes.174 Chandler perfectly sums up another 
significant disadvantage in that: 
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Most draught horses and their drivers were provided on short-term contracts by civilian 
contractors. Most of these were local, often operating on a two-day march which caused 
endless problems of replacement […] the civilian drivers proved most unwilling to 
court a glorious death for their temporary employers, and often deserted their 
cumbersome charges and fled at the first hint of action.175 
Due to these civilian problems, as well as the weight of the guns, the weapons would 
rarely be repositioned on the battlefield. However, exceptions can be found throughout 
the war, such as the use of light two-pounder cannons by the Dutch Colonel 
Wertmuller. His aggressive use of these guns allowed him to capture the villages of 
Franquenay and Taviers during the Battle of Ramillies, a most consequential period of 
the battle.176 Equally, the offensive actions of the French Artillery commander the 
Marquis de St Hilaire, who was an exponent of moving his pieces around the battlefield 
to threatened areas, such as his devastating use of them at the Battle of Malplaquet177. 
Colonel de la Colonie describes how St Hilaire dealt with the advance of the Allied 
infantry: 
As soon as this dense column appeared in the avenue, fourteen guns were promptly 
brought up in front of our brigade almost in line with the regiment of Garde Francaise. 
The fire of this battery was terrific, and hardly a shot missed its mark. I could not help 
noticing the officer in command, who although he seemed elderly was nevertheless so 
active that in giving his orders there was no cessation of actions anywhere.178 
The medieval names attributed to the guns had only just begun to be dispensed 
with; terms such as Sakers and Culverins were phased out in favour of the nomenclature 
of categorising them via the weight of the shot used. The British Artillery utilised light 
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one-pounder and three-pounder guns for use with the individual battalions, known as 
battalion guns. The main field artillery comprised six-pounder, nine-pounder and 
sixtenn-pounder’s lined up across the battlefield. The British artillery trains rarely used 
heavier guns than the sixteen-pounder on the battlefield, though Marlborough utilised 
some twenty-four pounders at Ramillies. However, we should not paint a completely 
undesirable picture of the British artillery in the War of the Spanish Succession, given 
that Marlborough was ably served by his artillerymen, including its outstanding 
commander Holcroft Blood.179 
The artillery acted similarly in the War of the Austrian Succession 1740–48 
though the Royal Regiment was now composed of more Englishmen, not relying on 
European gunners as before. The guns still retained many of their previous features, 
such as their lack of mobility and organisation. Civilians were still contracted to pull the 
guns with their own horses, resulting in the usual mobility problems, as the civilians 
would leave the battlefield once the engagement began to protect their horses. 
Consequently, if a battle was lost, such as at the Battle of Fontenoy, the guns would be 
lost to the enemy as they could no longer be towed off the battlefield. The lack of 
respect held for the British artillery by the French is best illustrated in Browne’s work 
England’s Artillerymen. It relates of a pantomime played within the French Winter 
quarters, whereby the clown mocks an English officer for being unprepared for war.180 
How then did the artillery become such an influential force during the Seven 
Years War? A chief component was due to the work achieved at the Royal Military 
Academy at Woolwich. This academy was set up in 1741, by a royal warrant of King 
George II. It was created to instruct the ‘raw and inexperienced people belonging to the 
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Military branch of this office, in the several parts of Mathematics necessary to qualify 
them for the service of the Artillery’.181 These raw and inexperienced people were the 
officers, non-commissioned officers and the cadets who would be taught at the 
Academy via lectures and practical experience. This all indicates that the artillery 
needed to go through some form of transformation. The Board of Ordnance understood 
the need for a repository of information, which could then be taught to any young 
gentlemen who would enlist. This system would provide the structure and training 
necessary for the corps of artillery to improve. This structured environment provided a 
focal point to impart knowledge on the burgeoning military science revolution to its 
cadets, focusing on the mathematics of fortification and on the ballistics revolution 
dealing with cannonball velocities and air resistance. This allowed the British state to 
marshal its intellectual prowess into improving its armed forces, by staffing the artillery 
with cadets who had been imparted with this knowledge. Due to this, Steele notes that it 
had become increasingly valuable for European governments to invest in providing 
academies for the more scientific branches of its armies, e.g. the artillery and 
engineers.182  
The cadets taught at the academy were admitted upon acceptance by the Master-
General of the Ordnance and aged between ten and thirty.183 The education was based 
upon three days of lectures in mathematics followed by three days of practice.184 At the 
Academy’s inception, there were only six staff members; two mathematicians, a French 
language master, a drawing master and two model makers. These were led by the Chief 
Master, who was Professor of Artillery and Fortification, a man named John Muller. A 
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German, he had been labelled as ‘the scholastic father of all the great engineers which 
this country has employed for forty years’.185 The lectures covered the mathematics of 
the time, including: algebra, geometry, plane trigonometry and conic sections to name a 
few.186 This mathematical basis was then applied to the use of the artillery, matching up 
with the artillery sciences of ballistics, ranges, elevations and projectiles. All this 
education would provide them with the ability to solve mathematical problems 
pertaining to their working careers in the artillery.  
John Muller was initially supported by another Master, a Mr Derham, though 
upon his death in 1743, he was replaced by Thomas Simpson, a self-taught 
mathematician who had written extensively, his notable works being the Elements of 
Geometry and Doctrine and Application of Fluxions.187 Muller was heavily influenced 
by Benjamin Robins, a Royal Society fellow, whose work New Principles of Gunnery, 
written in 1742, instituted the ballistics revolution, and was influential enough for 
Frederick II King of Prussia to request Leonhard Euler to provide a translation that 
could be used to train his own artillery.188 Charles Hutton, a later notable professor at 
the Academy, wrote that Robins’ work was: 
The first work that can be considered as attempting to establish a practical system of 
gunnery, and projectiles, on good experiments, on the force of gunpowder, on the 
resistance of the air, and on the effects of different pieces of artillery.189 
Muller’s work A Treatise of Artillery, built upon this, giving his commentary upon 
Robins and Vauban and including what he had discovered in this emerging military 
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science.190 This work was important enough to later be used by the Continental army to 
train their artillery during the American War for Independence.191 
The theory taught at the Academy was supplemented by practical training. When 
the three days of theory lectures were completed, three days of practical experience 
were taught by the senior officers and masters. This was taught to all the men at the 
Academy, the cadets as well as the men in the Regiment. The practice would take many 
forms; training was conducted in ‘the manner of serving and firing all sorts of pieces of 
artillery’192 as well as learning the ‘proper charges of the different pieces, according to 
the several services in which they may be employed’.193 The men would run through the 
motions for the laying, loading and firing of the guns. As Muller writes: 
When the piece has been fired, it is sponged, to clear it from any dust or sparks of fire 
that might remain in it, and loaded: then the centre line is found, as before; and if the 
shot went too high or too low, the elevation is altered accordingly.194 
This constant repetitive weapons training would instil a habitual experience, which they 
would instinctively fall back on in the heat of combat. 
Not only was form drilled into the men but accuracy was also paramount. The 
men were ‘exercised in the hitting of marks, whether point blank, or at any degree of 
elevation.’195 This was achieved through two measures. First, by finding the centre line 
of the gun, using an instrument called a perpendicular. The centre line was found 
between two points, one at the breech and the other at the muzzle, which were then 
marked with chalk. This was used to aim the cannon towards the enemy. The second 
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measure was achieved through adjusting the elevation to find the range. Muller 
indicates that ‘a quadrant is introduced into the mouth, in order to give it a proper 
elevation, which at first is guessed at, according to the distance the target is from the 
piece’.196 His insight suggests that though the mathematical science of ranges had come 
far, a degree of experience through training was still necessary, as only this would give 
them the proper understanding of which size quadrant to utilise. The lessons on 
trajectories and ranges would transition over into the first-hand practice of accuracy in 
the field. The training was conducted with the intention of instilling preparation for war. 
The Rules and Orders state that the cadets were ‘directed to perform with the same care 
and precautions as are used in real war.’197 This training was all conducted with a view 
to then evaluate the cadets and place them in classes. The first consisted of the best 
cadets; the second class those who had become good at their work, and the last class 
made up of those undesirable for the service. This grading system not only pushed the 
cadets on competitively to achieve higher levels of success, but also introduced a level 
of competency within the artillery as those who were unsuitable would not be accepted 
into the force. 
Education was not the only thing important to come out of the Academy. The 
experimentation conducted there upon the guns would be crucial to the success of the 
Seven Years War. Building upon the prototypes brought across from Europe by Colonel 
Weideman and Baron Stark, the Academy along with the Board of Ordnance 
experimented on ways to make the six-pounder lighter and shorter.198 This was 
influenced by the preliminary investigations of Benjamin Robins, especially his Maxim 
XIV in his New Principles of Gunnery, which stated that:  
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If two pieces of cannon of the same bore, but of different lengths, are successively fired 
at the same elevation with the same charge of powder; then it will frequently happen, 
that some of the ranges with the shorter piece will exceed some of those with the 
longer.199 
Through further investigations conducted by John Muller which corroborated Robins’ 
findings, the army created the short six-pounder cannon, which was lighter but still 
retained the relative ranges of the larger six-pounder pieces. The short six-pounder 
would subsequently have a profound influence on the artillery’s success during the war. 
Promotion in the artillery at the time was through seniority. Unlike the cavalry 
and infantry, promotion through the ranks of the artillery was gained through a vacancy 
in the position, as the purchase of commissions was not allowed. Promotion was strictly 
through seniority, usually obtained on the death of a senior officer, which usually made 
advancement in the profession slow.200 Despite the limitations for advancement in this 
system, it enabled the artillery to be staffed with officers who understood their 
profession, and thanks to the work at the academy the officers were generally well 
trained and adept at their job. The inability to purchase commissions ensured that 
unskilled officers could not obtain positions of high rank within the artillery, unlike the 
infantry and cavalry. One feature of the artillery in the Seven Years War is directly 
attributable to the seniority system. We observe men of low rank holding positions of 
high power within the artillery on campaign. Many of the officers who held commands 
during the West German campaign were only captains, such as William Phillips the 
British artillery commander. This was caused by their inability to reach higher ranks 
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due to the seniority system, yet the army had placed these men in positions of power 
due their ability. 
This faith in their ability may be due to the knowledge that many of the officers 
who commanded the brigades on campaign were previously cadets at the Academy, as 
the table in Appendix 1 shows.201 Captain Phillips began his career as a cadet gunner in 
1746, rising through the ranks in the 1750’s to reach his captaincy in May 1756. 
Equally, Phillips’ brigade commanders, Forbes Macbean, Duncan Drummond, and 
Edward Foy all started off as cadets in the 1740’s and 50’s rising to the rank of Captain 
or Captain-Lieutenant. This indicates the faith placed in the Officers who had come 
from the Academy, as though there were more senior officers in the artillery, these men 
were chosen to lead the artillery in Europe. The brigade commanders were equally 
supported by Lieutenants who had also come from the Academy. 2nd Lieutenants John 
Carden, Robert Rogers, and Vaughan Lloyd had all been at the Academy during 1755/6. 
These men were all rapidly promoted to 2nd Lieutenant in early 1759 and given 
positions within the army that was in Germany. 
Upon the artillery’s arrival with the first waves of British troops, the Allied army 
had already fought in the Battle of Bergen 13 April 1759.202 Though the battle featured 
no British troops it is still noteworthy for the severe lack of artillery within Prince 
Ferdinand’s army. His multiple attacks upon Bergen were regularly repulsed due to the 
actions of the more numerous French artillery. This showed to Prince Ferdinand the 
merits of having a strong supporting arm of artillery. Frederick the Great consequently 
suggested to Ferdinand that he ‘should seriously consider [increasing] your heavy guns. 
In this accursed war it is impossible to succeed without having many of them’.203 The 
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British artillery’s arrival then was at a crucial moment and a welcome addition to the 
Allied army. 
The artillery’s potent use as an offensive weapon was displayed multiple times 
during the war. It was first demonstrated at the Battle of Minden 1 August 1759.204 
Much has been written on this battle, especially on the famous infantry advance as well 
as the cavalry’s inactivity, though less focus has been given to the artillery. This 
offensive capacity was displayed during the deployment of the light artillery brigades at 
the windmill at Hahlen. This indicated the willingness by Prince Ferdinand to group his 
artillery brigades together in a large battery which could dominate the field. The light 
brigades of artillery, composed each of nine short six-pounder cannons, were led by the 
Academy graduates Captains Foy and Macbean. At the critical juncture of the battle, 
during the British infantry advance, the artillery brigades were important in holding the 
left of the line. Prince Ferdinand in his dispatches wrote ‘H.S.H immediately caused 
Capt Foye’s brigade to advance, and posted them near the Windmill of Hahlen, with 
orders to fire without intermission which they did with great success.’205 This indicates 
the industrious use of the guns to throw back the galling fire from the French artillery, 
as well as providing supporting fire when faced with the French infantry counterattack.  
Fortescue describes how ‘Observing the excellent practice of Foy’s battery 
before Hahlen, Ferdinand had already sent Macbean’s British battery to join it and 
ordered Haase’s Hanoverian brigade of heavy guns to the same position’206 to form a 
large battery where they ‘played with great success’207 against the left wing of the 
French army. This artillery tactic would not become famous till much later, through 
Napoleon Bonaparte’s innovative use. He utilised his artillery extensively in massed 
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batteries to create weak points within the enemies force from which to push through 
with a combined arms attack.208 Prince Ferdinand’s massed battery at Hahlen was 
similar to Napoleons approach to tactics.209 The battery knocked out the French left 
wing artillery, blasted holes through the French cavalry as well as countering the parry 
of the French and Saxon infantry brigades.210 When combined with the famed infantry 
attack, it ultimately facilitated the general advance against the centre of the French 
army. 
The other notable feature of the artillery was its mobility. It displayed this both 
at Minden and Warburg. The speed with which the British artillery followed up the 
retreating French at Minden, compensated for the failure of the British cavalry to follow 
up the advance. This was an age where guns were usually hard to manoeuvre; the 
aptitude to fluidly limber up the guns and then move over the rough ground indicates 
their previous training in the movement of the artillery. This is where the lighter short-
six pounder gun would have been influential, its manoeuvrability being key in following 
up the retreating French. Despite the continued use of civilian drivers (though these men 
were now tied to longer contracts) and that many of the men were dismounted, the 
fluidity of the artillery brigades are noteworthy.211 The men were able to quickly 
calculate the ranges to the enemy and expertly service their weapons to exact the highest 
casualties. This brings us back to the training done at the Royal Military Academy. The 
exercise in the ‘hitting of marks… at any degree of elevation’212 would have embedded 
a professionalism in the men to achieve the same standard whilst in battle. When you 
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take into account they did this multiple times, redeploying constantly while following 
up the enemy it is a thing to be admired. 213 
This mobility was improved upon at the Battle of Warburg.214 The artillery were 
thrown into a tricky situation when ordered to support the cavalry’s advance over five 
miles of rough ground. As Davis describes Phillips ‘ordered his guns into the most 
unprecedented manoeuvre in British Artillery history’.215 During the cavalry’s rapid 
advance towards the French lines, the artillery were able to keep pace with them. The 
British artillery brigade was part of the column commanded by Wilhelm Count of 
Schaumburg-Lippe-Buckeburg,216  the allied artillery commander during the Western 
German Campaign.217 Prince Ferdinand put great faith in his abilities, with his 
understanding of artillery warfare crucial to the success of the Allied army, Ferdinand 
stating that ‘all Orders relating to the Artillery depended upon him’.218 He may have 
influenced the success of the advance, as he would later indicate his ability in 
manoeuvring artillery over distances on difficult terrain at the battle of 
Vellinghausen.219 The extraordinary feat at Warburg was praised by commanders on 
both sides, especially since the heavy twelve-pounders maintained the same pace. An 
anonymous source reports that: 
Captain Phillips also brought up the English artillery on a gallop, and seconded the 
attack in a surprising manner, having, by a very severe cannonade obliged those who 
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had passed the Dymel, and were formed on the other side, to retire with the greatest 
precipitation.220 
However daring the action, Captain Phillips knew his corps were up to the task. 
His extensive training at the Academy, combined with the experience gained in the field 
would have informed his decision. He must have known the component parts of the 
guns would be able to handle the stress of the speed and distance, otherwise he would 
not have given the order. By extracting all the mobility he could get out of his guns, he 
came upon the French flank at a crucial moment. The men once again displayed their 
experience and training in quickly providing fire support to the cavalry. Once the 
cavalry had been defeated, they switched their target upon the French infantry, and then 
followed up their retreat, similar to the action at Minden. 
Mention must be made of the men’s fitness. In both battles described they went 
through severe exertion in their duty. Having spent a considerable portion of the day at 
Minden engaged, the men had to constantly service their guns to maintain the centre-
right of the line. This would involve all the labour of loading, aiming and firing the gun, 
but also pushing it back into position once the recoil had blown it backwards. Despite 
the alterations, these pieces were still heavy and would have exacted a physical toll on 
the men. To keep up such an unrelenting level of fire is a testament to their fitness. At 
Warburg they ran over five miles beside their guns, after which they then engaged the 
enemy, highlighting their endurance, which may have come about due to the practical 
training conducted at the academy, or through the general improvement born of constant 
training while on campaign. 
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The later battle of Kloster-Kamp, 16 October 1760, provides limited sources on 
the conduct of the artillery, possibly due to the lack of a large artillery presence at the 
battle, which could have been the deciding factor in the defeat of the Allied army. We 
see at Minden and Warburg that the artillery provided the punch to break through the 
enemy lines; however since the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick did not have a 
considerable force of heavy guns at Kloster-Kamp he could not use them in an offensive 
capacity. This resulted in a protracted Infantry engagement which eventually created a 
deadlock. The importance of artillery cannot be understated, reminding us of Frederick 
the Great’s earlier comments. An anonymous source suggests that artillery were present 
at the battle, whereby it states that one gun was lost to bursting,221 yet I have not 
discovered any further extensive reports and so can only surmise upon the battle. 
The artillery came to the fore once again at the Battle of Vellinghausen.222 This 
battle will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter, so I will only briefly sketch 
in some of the actions of the artillery. All the values of the artillery were on display at 
this engagement, the rapid movement of the guns over to the left flank to counter 
Marshal Broglie’s attack, as well as the destructive capability of the guns firing from the 
natural elevation of the Dinckerberg, which dominated the area. Unlike Ferdinand’s 
earlier battles at Minden and Warburg, Vellinghausen was a defensive engagement. As 
such it would negate the offensive capabilities of the artillery shown during those two 
earlier battles. This may be a reason as to why there was a lack of commentary on the 
artillery in the senior commanders accounts of the battle compared to Minden. 
However, an anonymous journal gives us incredible insight into the actions of the battle, 
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especially the artillery’s importance in throwing back the French assaults on the village 
of Vellinghausen.223  
Ultimately the artillery during the Seven Years War witnessed a significant 
increase in success compared to the previous wars of the Spanish and Austrian 
Successions. The development of a scientific understanding of ballistics, which was 
coupled with the mathematical and practical education undertaken at the Royal Military 
Academy furnished the artillery with officers who understood how to utilise their 
weapons to the fullest. When coupled with experience through repeated engagements 
and the earlier introduction of improved weaponry, this culminated in the dominance of 
the British artillery, which was an important factor in the performance of the Allied 
army. 
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The Battle of Vellinghausen 
 
One rule we frequently observe in warfare is the general improvement of an army’s skill 
the longer it consistently engages in campaigns. So long as the army was not repeatedly 
crippled by losses, the soldiers became more veteran at conducting themselves and 
divisions of control such as brigades became better at coordinating tactics. By using the 
Battle of Vellinghausen as a case study, this chapter will discover whether the British 
Army improved its performance throughout the war, thus answering the main emphasis 
of this study. Utilising the previous chapters as a benchmark for what changes were 
inducted into the several branches of the army, we can utilise a holistic analysis to 
investigate how the army improved as a whole. When we investigate the improvements 
upon an army, we observe three categories that these improvements fall under: 
training/experience while on campaign, new technology, and new tactics/doctrine 
introduced. Were these improvements undertaken through innovation, or assumed to 
provide counter-measures to elements in the enemy or even allied forces? This analysis 
will be undertaken by scrutinising the accounts of the battle to give us a glimpse of the 
fighting style of the British army during the Battle of Vellinghausen, the last major 
battle of the Western German theatre of operations. The accounts are limited, but 
provide us with a good cross-section of resources. We gain a tactical understanding 
from the general field officers accounts, such as Ferdinand’s report to King George II, 
or Lord Granby’s account to Lord Bute;224 whereas a more personal narrative is 
provided by the private soldiers accounts, such as those of Corporal Todd and John 
Tory.225 Non-English viewpoints are provided by the Hanoverian General August 
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Friedrich von Sporcken as well as the opposition’s account provided by one of the 
French commanders, Victor-François 2nd Duc de Broglie in his letter to Prince Xavier, 
or another of his as well as Charles, Prince of Soubise’s accounts displayed in the 
Aberdeen Magazine.226 The well-known anonymous journal of the operations of the 
Allied Army provides further scope, though another anonymous Journal of the war 
found in the additional manuscripts at the British Library is a more valuable source, as it 
provides extensive in-depth detail of the events of the battle which has not been 
previously utilised.227 
Before a qualitative analysis can be undertaken, a summary of the battle must be 
delivered to acquaint the reader with events, so that one will have a better grasp of the 
subject matter to which the improvements may be attributed. The Battle of 
Vellinghausen was fought on the 15/16 July 1761 and its importance cannot be 
overstated not only in its strategic sense, but for our tactical analysis. As C.T. Atkinson 
states:  
If it lacks the dramatic elements which distinguish Minden and Warburg and was not 
followed up by any strategical counter-stroke, it was in its way as decisive as any mere 
defensive action fought against considerable superiority of numbers could possibly 
be.228  
The French aim was very simple, by joining their two large armies together they 
planned to use their weight of numbers to force Ferdinand to give up Lippstadt, a vital 
position on the defensive line into Westphalia and his supplies back in Emden. This 
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operation was very similar to how Ferdinand had been driven out of Hesse during the 
Warburg campaign. However, Ferdinand was confident in his army’s ability in combat, 
given the many victories he had achieved, and so chose to defend Lippstadt. Prince 
Ferdinand manoeuvred into a defensive position near the town of Ham, the name of 
Vellinghausen being taken from the little village occupied on the Allied Army’s left 
flank. The Allied Army’s inferiority in numbers (60,000 men as opposed to 100,000) 
indicated that Ferdinand had complete belief in his army’s ability. This was coupled 
with his understanding of the topographical strength of his position, whereby a marshy 
stream ran along his front, with the Dinckerberg hill dominating his left flank. After 
initial skirmishing through the days of the 13/15 July, Broglie having utilised the close 
ground surrounding Oestlinghausen, a village near Vellinghausen, advanced with his 
army in three columns upon the unprepared General the Marquis of Granby, who 
commanded a division on the extreme left wing. The French light infantry pushed back 
the British left wing, forcing Lord Granby to front his division obliquely towards the 
river Lippe to protect his flank. The Legion Britannique and the Highlanders supported 
by the 15th Light Dragoons were able to force back the French light infantry, shoring up 
Lord Granby’s left flank. As Prince Ferdinand became aware of Marshal Broglie’s 
attack, he shifted his army left to support Lord Granby, leaving Charles William 
Ferdinand, the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick to watch the motions of the second 
French army under Prince Soubise. Through the rest of the evening the French forces 
under Marshal Broglie launched multiple attacks upon Lord Granby’s forces to no avail. 
The night of the 15 July saw constant skirmishing between the outposts of each army, 
which led onto another major attack early on the 16 July. General Heinrich Wilhelm von 
Wutginau who had supported Lord Granby’s left flank began to push back the French 
forces in his sector, who perceiving they were vastly outnumbered began a general 
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retreat.229 This was followed up by the English grenadiers attack on Marshal Broglie’s 
forces, which resulted in a large number of prisoners. Prince Soubise who had spent 
most of the first day vacillating, launched a few half-hearted attacks upon Prince 
Ferdinand’s front, though the determined defence of the stream crossings dissuaded any 
major effort, and Soubise eventually withdrew with Marshal Broglie. 
Throughout the battle we see evidence of the improvements that had begun to 
pervade the British army, which can be collated into three types. The first type of 
improvement witnessed is that which is gained through extensive training and the 
accumulation of combat experience. This would have only been obtained by veteran 
regiments used to the many campaigns and battles they had fought in. By the time of the 
battle of Vellinghausen, two-and-a-half years had passed since many of the regiments 
had arrived in Germany in the summer of 1758. Due to this, many of them had gained 
extensive experience in the plethora of battles fought. Though more extensive research 
will need to be undertaken to discover whether there was a core of experienced officers 
and NCO’s that served throughout this period of time, the records of the Court and City 
Kalendar show that the upper echelons of command in the regiments, the Lieutenant-
Colonels and Majors, continued their service in the regiments which campaigned in 
Germany; officers such as Major William Eustace of the 5th Foot (Hodgson’s) or 
Lieutenant Colonel Edward Pole of the 23rd Welsh Fusiliers served in Germany from 
1758-1763.230 Therefore these men would continue to grow in experience as they led the 
regiment in combat and undertook the training on field-days, with that experience 
filtering down into the officers below them. As Houlding argues, the general pattern of 
the British Army while on a campaign was one of ‘initial inadequacy, followed by 
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endless and intensive practice, imposed upon the regiments by the shortcomings of 
peacetime training.’231 This inadequacy of training in peacetime was due to the lack of 
substantial training in battlefield capability, such as regular training on firing and 
manoeuvre. These factors were only addressed while on campaign, and in fact it appears 
were regularly attended to by all the regiments.232 This training was conducted by 
individual regiments through participating in ‘field-days’ or by practicing ‘firings’. It 
was only conducted while on campaign but was a regular feature, as the Military order 
books for 1758-1759 show.233 A few sections of the Order books will suffice to indicate 
the regularity of this training: 
25 March 1759: Stuart’s will have a field day.234 
4 April 1759: Kingsley’s have a field day to-morrow.235 
9 April 1759: Lord George Sackville has ordered three barrels of powder to be brought 
to town for each battalion, each regiment is to keep 18 rounds per man and the best (?) 
powder, and may make use of the remainder to practise firings. The Welsh Fusiliers 
have a field day to-morrow.236 
16 April: Napier’s a field day to-morrow.237 
26 April 1759: Fusiliers and Stuart’s a field day to-morrow.238 
The regular training of the regiments would have been conducted with the aim 
of maintaining a high level of ability within the ranks, so that the regiments would be 
combat ready whenever a situation arose. Training in the basics was essential but 
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brigade level tactics would also have to be practiced, something the British army did not 
prepare when not on campaign. Houlding argues that though the general basics of the 
parade ground manoeuvre as well as the manual exercise and platoon firings were 
regularly practised, regiments went to war poorly prepared in conducting brigade level 
tactics, something that would have to be rectified through experience on campaign.239 
The pivot manoeuvre conducted by Lord Granby at Vellinghausen indicates that the 
Army became successful in conducting these brigade size manoeuvres by the later 
period of the war. A Journal describes how: 
The Enemy by advancing along the Ham road and obliging the Light Troops to give 
way had already in a certain degree turned the left Flank. His Lordship therefore 
directed the left wing to front obliquely towards the Lippe still however preserving its 
position on the heights and thereby commanding the low Ground between him and the 
River.240 
This manoeuvre had not been undertaken on the battlefield previously, with the army 
only needing to shake itself out from column of march into line of battle. As the Army 
had no need to execute this pivot manoeuvre in earlier battles we do not know how 
comfortable they were performing it in the early stages of the war.  
We have talked in a previous chapter about the line infantry and their fire drill, 
specifically the regiments shift from the confusing platoon fire to the alternate fire used 
by other countries, most notably by Prussia. The rate of fire from British infantry had 
always been of a high level, the French themselves commenting on the superiority of 
British infantry firepower during the War of the Austrian Succession.241 Yet, 
improvements in firepower were observed during the War of the Austrian Succession, 
with the infantry performing much better in the later battles of Fontenoy, Rocoux and 
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Laffeldt as opposed to Dettingen. Moreover, an observation in the improvement of the 
infantry firepower can not be identified during the battles of the Seven Years War, as 
they maintain the same level of ability in the first battle compared to the later ones. This 
may be due to the period of a year between the British contingent’s arrival in July 1758 
and their use at the Battle of Minden in August 1759. Ferdinand may have intended the 
regiments to improve through constant drill to attain a high level of ability before he 
utilised them in battle, especially as many of the battalions would have been learning 
the new system of alternate fire as the military order books show.242 It appears there was 
no improvement to be made as the training in this period had already brought them up 
to the required level of excellence. The repetitive training would also have been needed 
to improve the experience of new drafts of men, who had been brought over to replace 
the injured in previous battles or on campaign, or the regular desertions that most armies 
found impossible to prevent during the course of the war; for example 4928 men had to 
be drafted into the army in April 1761.243 The excellence of the firepower is also 
witnessed at Vellinghausen, where a high level of fire superiority must have been 
maintained for Lord Granby’s corps to have held its position for most of the afternoon 
on the 15 July, similar to General Sporcken’s brigade at the battle of Minden; in fact 
Lord Granby in his orders for the day hints at the vast amount of ammunition spent by 
the regiments during the battle, to the degree that some battalions in the line were 
lacking ammunition to fire at the enemy during parts of the engagement.244  
Improvement through experience is also seen through the actions of the 
picquets. Advanced training in conducting and combatting the small-war tactics 
employed by their enemies would now have to be learnt while on campaign, features 
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that would be necessary for picquets to be adept at while on outpost duty. 245 The 
anonymous officer who translated De Jeney’s Partisan, highlights how British officers 
were unacquainted with the knowledge on irregular warfare, due to his ignorance of the 
vast amount of French literature on the subject, as he writes in his notes: 
When I had finished the Work, I began to have an higher Opinion of its Merit than I had 
at first conceived; and concluded, that it might be no unacceptable Book to many of my 
Brother-officers, especially those in the light Troops, as I do not remember to have 
before seen any thing of the kind, in any language.246  
Despite Houlding’s description of the men training in these skills, it is only in 
the later battles of the war, particularly Vellinghausen where these features can be 
identified. This insinuates a synthesis whereby the men became better at engaging in 
irregular warfare through the application of first-hand experience. The picquets had 
been massed together at Minden as an ad-hoc formation to capture the village of 
Hartum, and were not even utilised at Warburg as a distinct unit, the men instead 
staying with their parent battalions. This confirms that the picquets were not previously 
used as skirmishers. However, Vellinghausen gives us many situations in which the 
picquets were utilised in this manner. The spaced out formations were used to skirmish 
with the enemy to hinder their advance, holding many defensive positions on the 
battlefield separate from the main force, such as the villages of Vellinghausen and 
Kirch-Dinckern, as well as the crossings at Kleine-Muhl and Scheidingen; all very 
similar to the use of partisan forces as depicted in the works by Grandmaison and de 
Jeney;247 their use is also similarly identified through the constant skirmishing during 
the night of the 15 July: 
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The advanced Centinels of the two Armies during the Night being only separated from each 
other by the hollow way and in some places by a small field or two each sending Patroles where 
it was possible, those on our part were chiefly intended to discover whether the Enemy were 
employed in fortifying the height at the Landwher which they had got possession of in the 
evening & from which it might be difficult to dislodge them but the nearness of the two Armies 
prevented the possibility of discovering this, the Patroles immediately meeting and skirmishing 
with each other during the night.248 
I have already outlined the virtues of the artillery at Minden and Warburg, but 
they were equally as successful at Vellinghausen. The Seven Years War certainly 
identifies the shift in artillery tactics that would become notable in the Napoleonic 
Wars, where the artillery would have a much more profound effect on the battlefield. 
The artillery had a crucial role at Minden in defeating the French, and this was no less 
evident later at Vellinghausen. The manoeuvrability illustrated at Minden and Warburg 
was equally conspicuous at Vellinghausen, where Heinrich Count of Schaumburg-
Lippe-Buckeburg, a genius in artillery warfare at the time, quickly transferred the bulk 
of the Allied army’s artillery over to the left flank when the crisis of Marshal Broglie’s 
rapid advance had been identified.249 The transition of the artillery not only maintained 
Lord Granby’s position on the Dinckerberg, but also eventually won the battle for the 
Allies. In describing the French attack on Vellinghausen a Journal describes how the 
enemy ‘were so much exposed to our Cannon in attempting to penetrate there that they 
were not able to gain that Post which was still occupied by a detachment of our 
Picquets’.250 This galling fire was maintained for most of the evening and into the 
second day. Subsequently, when Wutginau’s attack was delivered on the French right 
flank, the journal continues to detail the effect of the artillery on the enemy: 
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The heavy fire of these fresh Troops against the Enemy posted in the enclosures on the 
Ham road and the great effect of Lord Granby’s Artillery the principal part of which 
was now placed On the height before his center galling extremely the Enemy posted 
behind the Landwher & raking the height and wood called the Rosenholtz as far as the 
Village of Bruningsen.251 
This journal repeatedly indicated the effectiveness of the Allied army’s artillery, and the 
now premier position for which artillery had on the battlefield. The guns access of the 
battlefield due to the increased range from the heights of the Dinckerberg, highlights 
Ferdinand’s willingness to mass his guns in large batteries from which to break the 
enemy’s forces; though whether the credit should go to the eminent Count of 
Schaumburg-Lippe-Buckeburg could be debated. Though there is no general skill 
improvement identified through the stages of the war, as they maintained a high level of 
ability in all three battles they were engaged, this would indicate that the work at the 
academy left the artillery better prepared for the war from the start. Unfortunately I 
cannot quantify the artillery’s improvement, as I cannot investigate how many losses in 
the French army were attributed to the artillery, yet its effects on the outcome of battles 
indicate its high level of ability. Apart from the brigades of artillery, skill improvement 
can be observed in the utilisation of the battalion guns. These weapons were usually 
short six-pounders and two guns were provided to each regiment. An anonymous 
Journal provides us with the comical use of the battalion guns at Warbug where the 
soldiers poor understanding of the recoil of the cannon resulted in the guns falling off 
the precipice into the river Dymel to which ‘at that moment embarrassed more than can 
well be expressed’.252 Development must have been made as Major Campbell of the 
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Highlanders describes how one of his men performed wonders with one of the 
Hanoverian battalion guns at Vellinghausen: 
Placing a bough before the mouth to mask his gun, he did great execution on the line of 
the French engaged man to man with the Hanoverians; after the action I found the round 
shott had taken two and three in a line, the grape sticking like Indian corn in some of 
them.253 
The second improvement conducted on an Army was through the development 
of new weapons technology. Yet during the course of the Seven Years War this 
underwent little change. Development tended to have appeared throughout the 
peacetime stages of the century. This is the case in the artillery, where as I have 
identified already, the creation of the new foundry at Woolwich as well as the new 
techniques in improving cannon boring provided greater accuracy for the artillery. 
Equally the better metallurgy techniques coupled with mathematical reasoning allowed 
the creation of the lighter short six-pounder,254 which having been invaluable at Minden 
and Warburg, was equally useful at Vellinghausen. As such the area of weapons 
technology cannot be considered a major factor towards the improvement of the army 
during the war. 
With this is mind, the greatest change is observed through the improvement in 
doctrine or tactics. One major shift in tactics can be seen through the adoption of ‘light’ 
formations to the army, adding to the existing use of picquets. These men were trained 
in the application of irregular or partisan warfare while on campaign, as well as fighting 
in open order advance guard units on the battlefield. With the formal adoption of the 
Legion Brittannique into the ranks of the British Army, as well as the introduction of 
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the light units of the Highlanders and the 15th Light Dragoons, we see a shift towards 
this adoption of irregular-warfare tactics already in use by most European states. This 
transition during the war reached its pinnacle at Vellinghausen, indicating a slow 
alteration to the Army, considering that these tactics had been experienced in the War of 
the Austrian Succession, and that the officers had been exposed to these theories at the 
very early stages of the war through the plethora of literature spreading through the 
British market.255 At Warburg the light elements had not been fully engaged and the 
limited accounts of Kloster-Kamp mean that we cannot deduce their fighting style, 
though we can infer from their use in the advance guard that they were trained in these 
roles. Moreover, the struggle on the left flank at Vellinghausen firmly indicates the 
effects of this shift in doctrine. The multiple formations of light troops available to the 
British forces as opposed to earlier battles are the greatest indicators. Lord Granby’s 
division included the light formations of the two battalions of Legion Britannique, the 
two battalions of Highlanders, the ad-hoc formations of Hessian Chasseurs, and the 15th 
Light Dragoons. These men were pitted against the French light troops consisting of the 
Volontaires de Saint-Victor. Having been forced from the wood around Vellinghausen 
they engaged each other in the enclosures and fields leading from the Dinkerberg to the 
river Lippe. The rear-guard action taken by the light troops is portrayed in the Journal, 
related how the light troops ‘had several times faced about to stop the Enemy without 
effect’,256 which mirrored the doctrine on how light infantry should be utilised in 
skirmishing with the enemy in order to delay their advance.257 The Highlanders had 
already skirmished with the advanced picquets of the enemy on the 13 July, where they 
had endeavoured to halt the advance of a detachment of Marshal Broglie’s force who 
had the intention of investigating the Allies position, which chronicles Prince 
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Ferdinand’s willingness to use them to counter the enemy’s reconnaissance in a petite-
guerre fashion.258 Instead of the simple counter-measures as advised by Humphrey 
Bland to deal with the enemy skirmishers,259 the army had now adopted the use of 
distinct units of skirmishers as seen in the other elements of the Allied army as well as 
the French armies. By the time of Vellinghausen, these units had become adept at the 
irregular-warfare fighting style, as identified in the accounts, and were pro-actively used 
by the Allied commanders to engage the enemy skirmishers in the same manner. The 
use of the light dragoons in a skirmishing capacity is also notable during the battle, as 
they were utilised in conjunction with the light infantry to engage the Volontaires de 
Saint-Victor who were defending Peters House (a farmhouse stronghold), ultimately 
securing Lord Granby’s left flank.260 Having probably been used at the battle in a 
dismounted capacity given the topography of the enclosed country, it shows their use as 
hybrid infantry, one of their roles as light dragoons. 
Another shift in doctrine which we see at Vellinghausen is the adoption of new 
division sized formations, which would provide sub-commanders with an all arms 
capability when apart from the support of the main army. Instead of the ‘columns’ that 
were formed from multiple brigades of the same unit type utilised at Minden, the Allied 
army began to form divisions of control that would be composed of all unit types. 
Warburg and Kloster-Kamp each observed detached commands under the Hereditary 
Prince of Brunswick formed by combining cavalry, infantry, and artillery. This reached 
its apotheosis at Vellinghausen, where Lord Granby’s divison was made up of cavalry, 
light infantry, line infantry, and a battery of Hanoverian artillery.261 This all-arms 
capability allowed Lord Granby to utilise all of his troops to work in conjunction while 
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engaging the enemy on the isolated left flank. His light cavalry scouted the approach of 
the French, while his light infantry skirmished with the enemy, and his line infantry 
ultimately held back the main assault supported by the firepower of his artillery on the 
Dinckerberg. This seems to be forward planning by Prince Ferdinand, as he aimed to 
give his general all the tools necessary to defend himself for an extended period of time 
away from the support of the main army in case he was attacked. This would later be a 
significant feature in the development of army structures associated with the Corps 
d’Armée of Revolutionary and Napoleonic French armies. 
Ultimately then the British army underwent several changes that improved its 
conduct as a fighting force. Outnumbered dramatically at Vellinghausen, the 
professionalism in the men allowed the army to critically hold the unforeseen attacks, 
shift their resources to create a localised numerical superiority and then strike back to 
win the battle. This professionalism was brought about chiefly through two factors: one 
being the many improvements within the army, those minor changes that saw many of 
the regiments become experienced units at conducting themselves in war; while the 
second more noticeable change was from the addition of new doctrine and tactics 
which, in the case of the light forces, had come about considerably later than their allies 
and enemies. Yet their adoption of massed batteries to decide the outcome of the battle 
was an innovative and crucially decisive feature. These improvements explain why the 
army succeeded in the many engagements they were part of. 
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Conclusion 
 
Upon reading the accounts of the British army during the Seven Years War, they paint a 
picture of men displaying exemplary courage, whose fortitude usually won them the 
battles they took part in; as Mr Reiche says of the army at Minden: ‘Their Bravery & 
Ardour, are universally extolled’.262 However when you delve deeper and cross 
reference the many sources, only then can you witness the many changes that developed 
the army into an experienced force capable of synchronising its several component parts 
together to achieve success in battle. This thesis has aimed to cover the gap in research 
in this area, utilising previously unidentified sources to show how the army improved 
into a professional force by the time of the battle of Vellinghausen in July 1761. By 
breaking down my thesis into several chapters, each focusing on a section of the army, 
and then identifying their improvements through the case study of the battle of 
Vellinghausen, this format has allowed me to identify the elements of the army and how 
they improved to become an integral part of the success of the Allied army. The limited 
discussion on the British army in Western Europe has usually focused on areas away 
from the battlefield, such as the economic and logistic factors, welfare, or training, but 
this thesis has spread into the under-developed section of battlefield combat in military 
history.263 
In conclusion, what does this thesis tell us about the army during this period? 
One notable feature is the strong influence the Prussian army had on the British army at 
this time. Several tactics from their regulations were assimilated into the army and 
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strongly influenced the way the regular line infantry and cavalry fought. The British 
infantry fought with more aggression, utilising the less complicated ‘alternate fire’ 
system, rather than the regulations ‘platoon fire’ system, and proactively attacking with 
the bayonet whenever the chance arose. Furthermore the use of grenadiers in special 
shock battalions would have a significant effect on the outcome of battles in the 
Western German theatre. The Allied success at the battles of Warburg and 
Vellinghausen were heavily influenced by the actions of the British grenadiers, whose 
use in separate formations provided the Allied army with an elite core of troops to 
utilise in certain phases of the battles. The line infantry who had strongly affected the 
course of battles in the War of the Austrian Succession retained the sense of dogmatic 
fortitude that was consistent throughout the century. This discipline and bravery was 
key to their success as attributed by the many accounts by officers on the battlefield; as 
Major General Waldegrave stated in his report of the battle of Kloster-Kamp: ‘I did not 
see any Officer of any Nation, but what exerted himself to the utmost, and the Men 
never offered to retire while they had ammunition’.264 
Meanwhile the cavalry’s adoption of the Prussian style galloping attack, when 
coupled with the cultural dash and aggression that we see in the British troops, formed 
this arm of the Allied army into a powerful force. It was the British cavalry’s use in this 
format that swung the battle in favour of the Allies at Warburg. Further research will be 
needed to identify to what degree the Prussian system was adopted into the army 
through the training, but due to length constraints this thesis can not sufficiently cover 
this topic. While Houlding has delved deeply into the training of the British army in the 
Eighteenth Century, his insight provides great in-depth detail on the level of British 
training in the peacetime and wartime stages of the century, but further research is 
needed to address the scale of the training conducted while on campaign in Western 
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Germany.265 This would allow me to identify how far the Prussian influences were 
adopted into the army, and whether they were practised regularly throughout the war. 
Away from the core strengths of the British army in the period, two branches 
would witness significant changes that would dramatically improve the army’s ability 
within battles. Steven Brumwell excellently depicted the changes to the army in 
America with special attention to the development of light infantry units.266 This would 
also be witnessed in Western Germany, where though the American changes were not 
instituted until late in 1761, the European influences from the Germanic contingents of 
the Allied army, as well as the opposing French, brought about a new transformation to 
the British infantry. The extensive literature on irregular warfare that filtered through 
into the British market, as well as the experiences of combatting the new style of tactics 
in Europe, led to initiatives that developed British forces capable of fighting in this 
style. In fact Campbell Dalrymple in his work A Military Essay, 1761, identifies the 
cultural shift pervading the British army, as his treatise provides many descriptions of 
how to conduct irregular warfare from a British standpoint.267 Meanwhile the Highland 
regiments, who had been specifically recruited to provide the irregular open-order 
tactics needed in the British army in Europe, would have a notable effect on the way the 
British army fought. Their outpost and skirmishing skills, were key to the events of the 
battles of Kloster-Kamp and Vellinghausen, such as their surprise assault on Fischers 
Corps at the seminary of Kloser-Kamp, or their protracted skirmish with the Volontaires 
de Saint-Victor on the left flank at Vellinghausen.  
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Furthermore, a vast change was witnessed in the artillery. With the development 
of the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich in 1741 the army had begun to produce a 
number of well-educated cadets for the artillery, who had begun to take up positions of 
command by the time of the Seven Years War. Their knowledge of the burgeoning 
science of ballistics through the teachings of Benjamin Robins and John Muller created 
an artillery force that had an advantage over their opponents who had not been 
introduced to these new theories.268 This would be witnessed throughout the Seven 
Years War, where the British artillery regularly showed their superiority over their 
French opponents. The use of the artillery in massed batteries was also a notable 
development in warfare at the time. Instead of spacing out the guns to cover the whole 
line, Prince Ferdinand placed his brigades together at certain places of the battlefield, 
where their weight of firepower could punch through the enemy formations. This tactic 
wouldn’t become famous till much later under the tutelage of Napoleon Bonaparte, 
whose battles during the Napoleonic wars featured this use of guns in massed batteries. 
The massed batteries deployed at the windmill of Hahlen at Minden were crucial to the 
success of the British infantry. Likewise, their use in massed formations on the 
Dinckerberg hill at Vellinghausen, held Marshal Broglie’s assault and then defeated 
him. This identifies the increased importance artillery was having on the battlefield. Just 
like the later French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, artillery was utilised in a 
manner than would win battles for the Allied army. One aspect that would be interesting 
to delve into would be the degree of education/training conducted at the Woolwich 
academy. Though we have the limited information from the Rules and Orders for the 
Royal Academy at Woolwich it would be interesting to investigate if there was a 
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syllabus, illuminating to what degree the cadets were educated and how that applied to 
the artillery.269  
The battle of Vellinghausen indicated that the army developed into a force 
capable of affecting the course of a battle, one that had absorbed elements from Europe 
as well as systems that countered them, yet it still retained the core of what had given it 
success throughout the early part of the Eighteenth Century.  However, the army still 
had weaknesses, such as the low mobility of the infantry, which cost the Allies victory 
at Kloster-Kamp; as well as occasionally neglecting its reconnaissance responsibilities, 
for example when Marshal Broglie’s force was able to surprise Lord Granby at 
Vellinghausen. Ultimately this thesis highlights the improvement the British army had 
over the course of the Seven Years War. As well as the many general improvements that 
the army witnessed through training and combat experience, which would turn them 
into a seasoned force, several changes in tactics and the development of new units were 
crucial to the army adapting to the new methods of warfare. All these change turned the 
British army into a core strength of the Allied army, and fundamentally made the British 
army a success in Western Europe. 
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